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FLORIDA'S TORT REFORM: RESPONSE TO A
PERSISTENT PROBLEM
PAMELA BURCH FORT,* THEODORE G. GRANGER,** RICKY L.
POLSTON,*** AND SHERI L. WILKES****
The rising cost and decreasing availability of insurance have
motivated numerous changes in Florida's tort system over the
past decade, particularly in the areas of medical malpractice
and automobile negligence. In this Article, the authors survey
pre-existing law, examine the alternatives considered by
lawmakers, and explain the changes adopted by the legislature.
They conclude that the 1986 tort law changes are the culmina-
tion of a decade of legislative labors to balance the rights of vic-
tims and needs of those who must pay.
Perhaps more than any other branch of the law, the law of torts
is a battleground of social theory.'
N RESPONSE to widespread difficulty in obtaining liability in-
surance in Florida, the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 19862
(the Act) was passed during the 1986 Regular Session. Concerned
with the problems of availability and affordability of liability in-
surance, the legislature embarked on a journey to resolve this "cri-
sis." It has culminated in a law that changes legal doctrines that
have existed for 200 years. The Act is a coalescence of bills in-
tended to produce significant changes in the insurance and tort
systems.
* Staff Director, Senate Committee on Commerce, Florida Legislature. B.A., 1975, J.D.,
1977, Florida State University.
** Legislative Analyst, Senate Committee on Commerce, Florida Legislature. B.A., 1978,
J.D., 1982, Florida State University.
*** Intern, Senate Committee on Commerce, Florida Legislature. Candidate for the de-
gree Juris Doctor, December 1986, Florida State University.
**** Legislative Analyst, Senate Committee on Commerce, Florida Legislature. B.S.,
1978, Georgia Southern College; J.D., 1983, Florida State University.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and are not intended to re-
flect the position of the Florida Senate.
Portions of this Article have been adapted from Review of Historical Analysis-Current
Perspectives of the Doctrine of Joint and Several Liability and a Review of Tort Reform,
prepared by the authors for the Senate Commerce Committee.
1. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (5th ed. 1984).
2. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.
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A Conference Committee, s appointed to reconcile the differences
between Senate Bill 4654 and House Bill 1344,1 negotiated into the
3. For lists of the House and Senate conferees, see FLA. H.R. JOUR. 571 (Reg. Sess. May
28, 1986); FLA. S. JoUR. 460 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986); FLA. S. JOUR. 479 (Reg. Sess. May 29,
1986).
4. Fla. SB 465 (1986) included various tort reform measures. It would have limited joint
and several liability to an amount not greater than the uncollectible amount multiplied by
the defendant's percentage of fault. Fla. SB 465, sec. 12(3)(d) (1986). It would have required
a plaintiff to obtain leave of court prior to pleading punitive damages and would have pro-
hibited discovery of financial worth until such pleading was permitted. Id. sec. 13(1). The
bill adhered to the Model Punitive Damages Statute, see infra note 61, at 179, by proposing
that a punitive damages award be transferred to the state's general revenue fund, except for
five percent to be retained by the plaintiff. Id. sec. 13(2). It would have facilitated accept-
ance of offer of judgments and demand for judgments by awarding reasonable attorney's
fees and costs if the judgment was within 25% of the offer or demand, id. sec. 14. Sec. 15,
and would have capped noneconomic damages at $500,000. Id. sec. 15(3). It would have
required: the court, upon request of either party, to order periodic payments of future dam-
ages exceeding $500,000, id. sec. 16(1); juries to itemize verdicts indicating past and future
damages, id. sec. 17; the court to reduce damages by the amount the claimant received from
all collateral sources, except those for which a subrogation right exists, id; and that no in-
surer or other provider of collateral source benefits would be entitled to subrogation rights
unless provided by law, id. sec. 18(4).
Fla. CS for SB 465, 349, 592, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 956, 977 and 1120 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as CS for SB 465] incorporated the listed bills, see infra note 169, and received a
unanimous roll call vote from the Senate Committee on Commerce. Secretary of Fla. S.,
Comm. on Com., Bill Action Report (Apr. 30, 1986) (on file with committee). CS for SB 465
changed the following provisions: joint and several liability was limited to economic dam-
ages, Fla. CS for SB 465, sec. 40(3) (1986); periodic payments of future damages which ex-
ceed $350,000 were required upon motion by either party, id. sec. 44(1)(b); the Florida Su-
preme Court was instructed to develop a plan for statewide implementation of mandatory
mediation and mandatory nonbinding arbitration, id. sec. 47(2); and a seven-member tort
reform study commission, to be chaired by the Insurance Commissioner, was created, id. sec.
48.
After it was reported favorably by the Committee on Commerce, Fla. CS for SB 465 was
heard by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary-Civil, which incorporated it into Fla. CS
for CS for SB 465, 349, 592, 698, 699, 701, 702, 956, 977 and 1120 [hereinafter cited as CS
for CS for SB 4651. FLA. S. JOUR. 313 (Reg. Sess. May 19, 1986). The Committee on the
Judiciary-Civil replaced the seven-member study commission with a three-member commis-
sion, to consist of the president of each state university with a law school (Florida State
University and the University of Florida) and a third person they would select. Fla. CS for
CS for SB 465, sec. 51(1) (1986).
CS for CS for SB 465 was further amended on the floor of the Senate on May 22, 1986.
FLA. S. JouR. 382 (Reg. Sess. May 22, 1986). The amendments included: a provision exempt-
ing specific causes of action from the limitation on joint and several liability, id. at 393; a
provision changing FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (1985) to require attorney's fees to be paid to the
prevailing party by both the losing party and the losing party's attorney in civil actions in
which the court determines there was no justiciable issue of law or fact, FLA. S. JOUR. 382,
395 (Reg. Sess. May 22, 1986); and a severability clause, id. at 397-98. The bill passed on
third reading, 38-to-1. Id. at 398 (Sen. Mann voting against).
5. The House Committee on Health Care and Insurance filed Fla. HB 1344 on May 6,
1986. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 270 (Reg. Sess. May 6, 1986). The bill required itemized verdicts indi-
cating reasonable expenses, economic loss, punitive damages, and noneconomic damages as
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final hours of the 1986 Regular Session to produce compromise leg-
islation that would be responsive to both the liability insurance
crisis and varied political concerns.' In this Article the authors re-
well as future and present damages, Fla. HB 1344, sec. 39 (1986); specified criteria for courts
to use when applying remittitur or additur, id. sec. 40; prevented pleading of punitive dam-
ages without leave of court, id. sec. 41; required the court to reduce damage awards by the
collateral sources available to the claimant, id. sec. 42; permitted periodic payments at the
request of either party if future damages exceed $250,000, id. sec. 43(1)(b); awarded attor-
ney's fees and costs against a party who unreasonably rejects a settlement offer if there is
more than a 25%"* difference between the settlement offer and the judgment, id. sec. 44(1);
authorized the court to require the parties to participate in a pretrial settlement conference,
id. sec. 45; limited noneconomic damages to $250,000 unless clear and convincing evidence
showed the award was not excessive (the bill specified evidentiary presumptions for ascer-
taining what is "excessive"), id. sec. 46; eliminated joint and several liability for defendants
who are less at fault than the plaintiff, id. sec. 48; specified that the new tort law provisions
would not apply when a more specific provision already exists (e.g. medical malpractice), id.
sec. 49; created a three-member Academic Task Force for Review of Tort and Insurance
Law, id. sec. 50; provided a nonseverability clause, id. sec. 52(4); and granted "good samari-
tan" immunity to individuals rendering emergency "code blue" treatment, id. sec. 63. See
Staff of Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care & Ins., PCB HC 86-100 (1986) Staff Analysis 20-
23, 25 (rev. May 2, 1986) (on file with committee). The bill was referred to the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 300 (Reg. Sess. May 8, 1986). Other tort bills were
filed in the House but none were as comprehensive as Fla. HB 1344. The other bills
included:
1. Fla. HB 172 (1986) eliminated joint and several liability when negligence is apportioned
among parties.
2. Fla. HB 416 (1986) provided that physicians responding to a "code blue" emergency
within a hospital would not be liable for medical treatment, if the physician acts as a rea-
sonably "prudent man."
3. Fla. HB 627 (1986) capped noneconomic damages at $250,000.
The House Committee on Appropriations incorporated HB 1344 into a committee substi-
tute, FLA. H.R. JOUR. 501 (Reg. Sess. May 22, 1986) with the following changes: punitive
damages were limited to three times the amount of compensatory damages unless clear and
convincing evidence showed that a larger award would not be excessive (the award would be
divided evenly between the claimant and either the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund
or other state funds), Fla. CS for HB 1344, sec. 51 (1986); and joint and several liability was
limited to any uncollectible amount multiplied by the defendant's percentage of fault (al-
though intentional torts and pollution damages would be exempted from this limitation), id.
sec. 52. See Staff of Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care & Ins., CS for HB 1344 (1986) Staff
Analysis 21-22 (rev. May 22, 1986) (on file with committee).
CS for HB 1344 passed on a roll call vote, 108-to-8, and was sent in messages to the
Senate on May 26, but was not received by the Senate until May 28. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF
LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 380, HB 1344. Also on May
28, the Senate sent CS for CS for SB 465 in messages to the House, which passed an amend-
ment, 109-to-3, replacing everything following the bill's enacting clause with the text of CS
for HB 1344. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 557, 559 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986). The Senate, upon motion
by Sen. Hair, Dem., Jacksonville, refused to concur with the House's amendment and re-
quested the House to recede from its position, or in the alternative, to agree to a conference
committee. FLA. S. JOUR. 423, 447 (Reg. Sess. May 28, 1986). The House refused to recede
and the bill proceeded to conference committee.
6. The conferees from the House appeared to surprise the Senate conferees with an offer
in the first meeting of the conference committee. Rep. Tom Gustafson, Dem., Ft. Lauder-
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view the state of various legal components of the civil tort system
prior to the passage of this Act, and present an historical perspec-
tive on issues that have indicated a need for reform. The authors
also analyze those provisions of the Act related to the tort system,
examining the legal effects and deficiencies of the Act.
I. PRIOR STATE OF THE LAW
The status of statutory and common law prior to passage of the
1986 Act is reviewed below. While the discussion focuses on Flor-
ida law, other states' laws are discussed for purposes of
comparison.
A. Joint and Several Liability
The doctrine of joint and several liability evolved from the prin-
ciple "the act of one is the act of all." Known as "entire" liability
at common law, the doctrine had been adopted, until recently, by
dale, offered, on behalf of the House, to adopt the Senate position on insurance if the Sen-
ate would accept the House tort provisions. Sen. Ken Jenne, Dem., Hollywood, who had
been appointed Chairman of the Conference Committee earlier in the meeting, stated that
while the Senate viewed it as a favorable step, the proposal would need to be evaluated. Fla.
Conference Comm. on Fla. CS for CS for SB 465 (1986), tape recording of proceedings (May
29, 1986) (on file with committee). The Senate at a later meeting rejected the House propo-
sal indicating that because the insurance and tort provisions of each bill were interrelated,
the Senate insurance and House tort sections could not be simply combined. Id. (May 30,
1986).
While many of the tort reform measures were resolved early in the Conference Committee
meetings, severability was at issue throughout. The House was adamantly in favor of a sev-
erability clause, but the Senate viewed rollback of insurance premiums and tort reform as
interdependent issues which could not be separated. Id. (June 4, 1986). Sen. Hair stated the
public was concerned with insurance costs, a rollback was needed to reduce costs, and tort
reform was necessary to accomplish the rollback. House members continued to maintain
that the tort and insurance issues were separable in that the tort reforms should be consid-
ered "fairness issues" which were not necessary to bring about an insurance premium
rollback. Rep. Gustafson stated that the tort reforms would bring about only minimal pre-
mium cost savings but that the primary purpose of a rate rollback and insurance regulation
is to flatten the swings in premium pricing. Id. Sen. Crawford, Dem., Winter Haven, stated
that he was under the impression that tort reform would bring about decreased insurance
premiums. Id. As of June 5, the major issues still unresolved involved joint and several
liability and capping noneconomic damages. Id. (June 5, 1986). However, by the last night of
the regular session at approximately eleven o'clock, the Conference Committee had unani-
mously agreed on all provisions of the bill. Id. (June 6, 1986).
The Conference Committee Report on CS for CS for SB 465 was adopted and the bill was
passed as amended. FLA. S. JOUR. 1092, 1117 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986); FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1425,
1452 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986). The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 37-to-2. FLA. S. JOUR.
1092, 1117 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986). The bill passed the House on a vote of 108-to-3. FLA.
H.R. JOUR. 1425, 1452 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986).
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as many as forty-five states, including Florida. Simply stated,
under joint and several liability, the liability is "joint" in that all
defendants may be joined to render compensation for an injury; it
is "several" in that each defendant is liable for the entire damage
amount; and, it is "joint and several" in that no defendant's liabil-
ity is extinguished until the plaintiff's judgment is completely sat-
isfied.' In its most extreme application, the doctrine can require a
defendant who is only one percent at fault to pay one hundred
percent of the damages if, for any reason, the plaintiff collects
nothing from the other defendants who are ninety-nine percent at
fault.
Critics contend that the doctrine of joint and several liability
contravenes the philosophy of comparative negligence. They argue
that requiring one joint tortfeasor to pay one hundred per cent of
the damages was a necessary evil under contributory negligence be-
cause legal principles of causation deemed injuries "indivisible,"
and because there was no way to determine each tortfeasor's de-
gree of negligence. But, they contend, the law should be different
under comparative negligence. While joint and several liability was
originally based on unity of action and indivisibility of injuries, to-
day triers of fact regularly apportion fault and "divide" injuries. In
Hoffman v. Jones,9 the Florida Supreme Court adopted compara-
tive negligence, reasoning that "[the liability of the defendant...
should. . . depend. . . upon what damages he caused,"'10 because
"[i]n the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever
be reached by a court is the equation of liability with fault."" Crit-
ics of joint and several liability contend that abrogation of the doc-
trine would further the principles of fairness espoused by the court
in Hoffman by making a defendant's liability depend upon his de-
gree of fault rather than upon the solvency of any codefendants.
7. STAFF OF THE FLA. S., COMM. ON CoM., A REVIEW OF HISTORICAL ANALYSIS-CURRENT
PERSPECTIVES OF THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND A REVIEW OF TORT
REFORM 28 (Mar. 1986) (on file with committee) [hereinafter cited as COM. COMM. REVIEW].
8. MATTHEW BENDER & CO., COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.30(2)
(1985).
9. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
10. Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).
11. Id. at 438.
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Florida courts, like the majority of courts nationwide, 12 have re-
jected these arguments,"3 but, to a great extent, have not fully ex-
plained why. They have, as the basis of their holdings, found that
the legislature intended that joint and several liability be retained.
This is because of the express joint and several liability language
contained in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 4
which provides a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors even
though judgment has not been recovered from all or any of them,
but only for those persons jointly or severally liable for the same
injury or death. 15
All sides agree that the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act is intended to ameliorate the potentially harsh ef-
fects of joint and several liability by allowing joint tortfeasors to
recoup monies expended in payment of damages in excess of their
proportionate shares.' 6 Whether this purpose is being achieved is
questionable. Various industry representatives have complained
that the act does not work. Although more quantifiable than any
other information pertaining to the joint and several liability ques-
tion, insurers have failed to provide data revealing the number of
judgments under which they have paid more than their propor-
tionate shares, the amounts in excess they have allegedly paid, the
number of instances in which they have sought contribution, and
the amounts of contribution received. Proponents of joint and sev-
eral liability also have failed to supply this data. The failure to
present this information renders allegations of inequity suspect.
Such figures would be of great interest because, among other
things, they would provide insight into the critical problems
caused by insolvent tortfeasors.17  Were it not for insolvent
tortfeasors there would be no need for the joint and several liabil-
ity doctrine because each party would be financially responsible for
damages that he caused. The insolvent tortfeasor presents the
problem of incomplete recovery by the plaintiff. As a result, the
12. Note, The Modification of Joint and Several Liability: Consideration of the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 288, 297 n.47 (1984).
13. Woods v. Withrow, 413 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 1982); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d
386, 392 (Fla. 1975).
14. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391-92 (Fla. 1975) (interpreting FLA. STAT. §
768.31 (1975)).
15. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1985).
16. Note, supra note 12, at 292.
17. "Insolvent tortfeasor" refers to a tortfeasor whose proportionate share of damages is
uncollectible because he is insolvent, absent, or immune from liability, or whose liability has
been extinguished either by release, settlement, or covenant not to sue.
TORT REFORM
proverbial "bottom line" becomes: Who is to pay the damages at-
tributable to the insolvent tortfeasor?
Most courts considering this question have refused to abolish the
doctrine, voicing the same concern as did the California Supreme
Court when it stated that to do so would seriously impair the ca-
pacity of negligently injured persons to obtain compensation for
damages incurred, 18 and that it should be left to the wrongdoers to
"work out between themselves" any apportionment. 19 These con-
siderations must be viewed in light of the countervailing principle
that persons under a system of comparative negligence should not
be required to pay more than their fair share of damages.
There is a social cost involved in either of these approaches. As-
suming that insurers and businesses are typically the "deep pock-
ets" who pay more than their proportionate shares of damages
under a system of joint and several liability, and that these defend-
ants are unable to recoup their excessive payments through contri-
bution, the increased costs attributable to the insolvent tortfeasor
are ultimately paid by the public in the form of higher premiums
and higher prices for goods and services. In the end, society pays.
On the other hand, if a plaintiff is denied compensation for an in-
solvent tortfeasor's share of damages, it is likely that if his re-
sources, such as insurance and savings, are insufficient to cover the
actual damages, then social assistance, such as Medicaid and wel-
fare, will be necessary to offset the damages. It is obvious that soci-
ety also pays the bill in this situation.
One of the major disputes with regard to the issue of changing
the doctrine of joint and several liability involves the impact
change would have upon the tort system itself. Abrogation would
probably significantly affect litigation involving multiple defend-
ants. In 1984, the Tort Litigation Review Commission, appointed
by the Florida Bar, published a major review of the current and
future status of Florida's tort system.20 The Commission concluded
that abolishing joint and several liability would have several effects
upon the way cases are tried:
1. The number of parties in each case would probably increase
because each party would presumably try to bring all other possi-
ble parties into court. This would result in a corresponding in-
18. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 906 (Cal. 1978).
19. Id. (quoting Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948)).
20. FLORIDA BAR, REPORT OF THE TORT LITIGATION REVIEW COMMISSION (Jan. 1984).
1986]
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crease in motion practice, case duration, and costs, thus, increasing
the administrative burden on the courts.
2. Rather than present a joint defense, defendants would fight
among themselves, each being concerned only with minimizing the
degree of fault allocated to him, and thus making a plaintiff's case
easier. This strategy could be especially costly in medical malprac-
tice cases because each health care professional would need sepa-
rate counsel.
3. Proximate cause may be affected because defendants often use
the defense that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of the event causing the injury. When a court is able to ap-
portion fault among defendants, it will be less likely to find inter-
vening or superseding causes of a plaintiff's injuries.
4. Vicarious liability may be affected or eliminated, requiring ev-
eryone, especially those in the health care system, to purchase sep-
arate insurance coverage. Those who have insurance could expect
to pay lower premiums for the same coverage because insurers
would not be required to pay the policy limits as often as under
joint and several liability.21
While plaintiffs would be expected to bring every possible de-
fendant into court, as suggested by the Commission, it is likely
that third-party actions (for example, defendants impleading other
defendants) would decrease almost proportionately. This decrease
in third-party actions might not precisely match the increase in
the number of defendants sued if the widely held assumption is
correct that defendants typically have more knowledge than plain-
tiffs regarding who and to what extent others contributed to an
injury. This assumption is certainly correct in a case where medical
malpractice is alleged and the plaintiff was anesthetized at the
time of the incident.
Settlement negotiations would be greatly affected by abrogation
of joint and several liability. Even with joint and several liability, it
is estimated that at least ninety percent of cases filed end in settle-
ment.2 2 Critics contend that under the traditional system defend-
ants have little bargaining power to effect settlement, especially if
they are the "deep pocket." This is true because a plaintiff is hesi-
tant to settle if he is at all apprehensive about the other joint de-
fendant's ability to pay. As a result, a joint defendant is more
21. Id. at 75-77.
22. FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., BACKGROUND FOR GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 1 (n.d.) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
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likely to settle at an amount exceeding what would be his actual
proportionate share so as to preclude the possibility of being re-
quired to pay even more after judgment is entered.
If the doctrine were to be abolished and each defendant became
severally liable only for his proportionate share, it is probable that
this settlement environment would change although it is question-
able whether the change would be an improvement. Plaintiffs may
resist settling because they are unsure of the settling defendant's
potential liability. Rather than risk having the remaining defend-
ants attribute the majority of fault to the "empty chair," claimants
might prefer to join all possible defendants.2 3 On the other hand,
because the potential liability of each defendant would be lower
and perhaps more easily predicted, it is possible that more settle-
ments would be reached.
While in many areas a change in the doctrine of joint and several
liability would be likely to have wide-ranging economic impact,
perhaps the most significant would be in the area of pollution lia-
bility and cleanup. Because of the unique problems encountered by
those responsible for preserving our environment, section 403.141,
Florida Statutes, expressly provides for the application of joint and
several liability in cases of air and water pollution. 4 Industries,
primarily those involved in the manufacture, transport, and stor-
age of hazardous materials, claim this is unfair and economically
detrimental to Florida citizens. They assert that their products and
services are indispensable to today's technologically advanced soci-
ety and that, as a result of being unfairly required to pay more
than their proportionate share of damages caused by pollutants,
their continued ability to provide these important products and
services is jeopardized because of the unaffordability and unavaila-
bility of pollution liability insurance. On the other hand, those re-
sponsible for prosecuting cases of environmental pollution contend
that because there is virtually no way to allocate the responsibility
for pollution in many cases, it would be impossible to make pol-
luters pay without joint and several liability.
23. J. Dimento & J. Harrison, Joint and Several Liability: A Study of the Fiscal and
Social Impact of a Change in the Doctrine 27 (Dec. 1985) (unpublished study) (on file, Flor-
ida State University Law Review).
24. FLA. STAT. § 403.141 (1985).
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B. Structured Settlements/Judgments
The traditional common law method of providing compensation to
an injured claimant has been by means of a lump-sum payment of
damages by the defendant or by the defendant's casualty insurer.25
Thus the trier of fact must determine all past and future damages
due a claimant.28 Florida follows the traditional rule of compensat-
ing for future losses by means of lump-sum judgments.2 7
One of the more critical and longstanding problems associated
with the traditional system is the lack of information at trial with
which to accurately assess future damages.2  Uncertainties such as
the state of the economy as well as the future physical condition of
the seriously injured claimant combine to make the award of these
damages in many instances little more than an educated guess.
Other factors have led many groups to call for a re-examination of
this area of tort law. One is the frequency of large jury awards
which has impacted on the availability and affordability of liability
insurance. Another is the development of income tax laws which
benefit claimants by providing tax savings for structuring the pay-
ment of future damages.29 Several states have designed alternatives
for payment of damages in order to address these problems: peri-
odic payments and structured settlements.
Some confusion has developed over structured settlements and
periodic payment acts. "[A] structured settlement is just that,
namely a 'settlement.' "30 Moreover, it is any settlement in which
the parties voluntarily agree to accept money or other considera-
tion over a period of time as opposed to a one-time lump-sum
award. On the other hand, periodic payment acts apply to the pay-
ment of judgments. The difference between a settlement and judg-
ment is the compulsion involved in the latter.3 1
25. Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1970); J. WEIR, STRUC-
TURED SETTLEMENTS 1-2 (1984); Elligett, The Periodic Payment of Judgments, 46 INS.
COUNS. J. 130, 130 (1979).
26. Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734, 734
(1980). This concept is sometimes referred to as the "single recovery rule." 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.2 (1956).
27. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783, 789 (Fla. 1985).
28. Henderson, supra note 26, at 734.
29. Structuring damage payments, if done correctly, results in tax-free payments to
claimants. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 179-2 C.B. 74.
30. J. WEIR, supra note 25, at 5.
31. Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgments, 66
A.B.A. J. 1524, 1524 (1980).
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Because structured settlements are voluntary, they are conse-
quently in the best interests of all parties. They might include: a
lump-sum payment equalling lost wages and medical expenses, or
in a death case lost contributions prior to settlement; funds for a.
seriously injured claimant's rehabilitation; a medical annuity cov-
ering future treatment and expenses; a lifelong or temporary in-
come equivalent to the decedent's or injured's lost earnings; an an-
nuity providing for educational or technical training for dependent
children; attorney's fees; and an adequate reserve to cover ex-
traordinary expenses or a death benefit for survivors.2 These are
just examples. "The precise terms and conditions of payment are
creatively tailored by the parties themselves to meet the specific
circumstances at hand . . .,,3
Many advantages are inherent in structured settlements for
claimants and defendants as well as the public, yet the benefit
most often sought is purely financial.34 Perhaps the most impor-
tant feature of the structured settlement is the opportunity it pro-
vides for obtaining significant tax savings.3 5 Under the present
lump-sum system, the amount is not subject to taxation at the
time of actual payment to the claimant, however, any income gen-
erated by investment of the lump sum is considered income and is
fully taxable in that year at the claimant's marginal rate.36 In con-
trast, the properly arranged structured settlement, that is, one
funded solely by the casualty insurer, whether self-funded or
funded through a life insurance company, will avoid the impact of
taxation and allow the claimant to receive the payments tax-free.3 7
32. Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A. J. 1527, 1528 (1980). For
several examples of structured settlements, see id. at 1529.
33. J. WEIR, supra note 25, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
34. Id. at 4.
35. Other advantages of the structured settlement include: an insurer-managed income
for the claimant, savings for the insurance company through the avoidance of disbursing one
large amount, payment of attorney's fees based on the actual financial value of the total
settlement rather than simply the amount of payments, and a spur to insurers to participate
in the rehabilitation of the severly injured claimant. Krause, supra note 32, at 1528-29.
Because structured settlements are purely voluntary and need no enabling legislation to
permit their use, it seems reasonable to conclude that there would be no opposition from
either the plaintiff's or defense bar or the insurance industry. And, indeed, this seems to be
the case. For example, the Florida Tort Litigation Review Commission declined to endorse
the Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act, favoring instead the use of structured set-
tlements. Likewise, the American Bar Association's Special Committee on the Tort Liability
System, which encompasses both the plaintiff's and defense bars, opposed the Model Act in
favor of structured settlements.
36. See J. WEIR, supra note 25, at 4; Henderson, supra note 26, at 736.
37. Rev. Rul. 79-220, 1979-2 C.B. 74.
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Less favored by some and often confused with structured settle-
ments are structured judgments, also known as periodic payment
of damages. This option, unlike the purely voluntary structured
settlement system, statutorily imposes periodic rather than lump-
sum payment of damages above a stipulated amount. These pay-
ments usually terminate at the plaintiffs death. Periodic payment
of damages has been used in many states, including Florida, to
limit the impact of medical malpractice awards, primarily in re-
sponse to the crisis in availability and affordability of medical mal-
practice insurance.3 8 Section 768.51, Florida Statutes,3 e authorized
periodic payments of future losses in medical malpractice cases at
the request of either party if the judgment included future losses
exceeding $200,000. Its constitutionality was upheld by the Florida
Supreme Court in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von
Stetina.0 Section 768.51 was amended in 1985 to, among other
things, raise the base amount of future losses to $500,000, provide
for offset of collateral sources, provide remedies for tardy pay-
ments and insolvent judgment debtors, require discharge of peri-
odic payments in the event of the claimant's death, and provide for
payment of attorney's contingency fees, if any.4 1
C. Collateral Source Rule
The common law collateral source rule prohibits the introduc-
tion of evidence to show that the plaintiff has received payments
for his injury from sources other than the defendant. This rule per-
mits the plaintiff to collect payment from more than one source.
Generally, Florida has followed the common law rule. 42 This poten-
tial for "double recovery" by the plaintiff has led some critics to
call for abrogation of the collateral source rule. Those state legisla-
tures that have done so believe that juries should be provided with
all information concerning a plaintiffs financial resources.
In those states that have modified the doctrine, the modification
usually takes one of two forms: either the court or the jury deducts
all forms of collateral compensation by applying a mandatory off-
38. Karzon, Medical Malpractice Statutes: A Retrospective Analysis, 2 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAW 693, 699 & n.52 (1984) (citing statutes mandating periodic payments in
medical malpractice cases).
39. FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1985), repealed by ch. 86-160, § 68, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 763.
40. 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985).
41. FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1985).
42. Hartnett v. Riveron, 361 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Janes v. Baptist Hosp.,
Inc., 349 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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set 43 or the jury must be presented with evidence of all forms of
collateral compensation. 44 In Florida, mandatory offset laws exist
in the areas of automobile accidents4" and medical malpractice.46
The court in medical malpractice cases and the jury in automobile
cases are required to reduce the amount of an award by the total of
all collateral sources paid to the claimant.
The Tort Litigation Review Commission recommended in its
1984 report that the legislature abrogate the collateral source rule
in personal injury and wrongful death cases to the same extent
that it has in automobile accident and medical malpractice cases.47
It recommended that the deductions, if any, be made by the trier
of fact pursuant to appropriate instructions. The Commission con-
cluded that no rational line could be drawn between automobile
accident and medical malpractice cases and all other cases involv-
ing personal injury and wrongful death.' 8
Changes in the collateral source rule have been upheld in four
states, including Florida, and struck down in three.4 e In Florida,
the rule has survived constitutional attack as applied to medical
malpractice cases. The Florida Supreme Court in 1981 applied the
traditional rational basis test to uphold section 768.50, Florida
43. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 40-41
(1982) (identifying the nature of offset policies in 16 states that had eliminated or modified
the collateral source rule).
44. Id.
45. FLA. STAT. § 627.7372 (1985).
46. FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (1985).
47. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 48-52. The Commission recommended that the rule
remain intact in all cases involving property damages because "[t]he collateral source in
such cases is usually first person home owners or collision insurance, as to which subrogation
rights exist on behalf of the insurer." Id. at 51.
48. The Commission cited a civil torts study prepared by the Administrative Office of
the Courts of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida indicating that 52% of a block of torts
cases disposed of during the first six months of 1983 involved automobile negligence, while
6% involved medical malpractice. Id. at 51 & app. 1-12. That study has since been updated
and now shows that 56.3% of tort cases disposed of during the first six months of 1985
involved automobile negligence, while 1.8% involved medical malpractice. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, CIVIL TORT STUDY 10 (Feb. 1986) (on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
49. The medical malpractice modification was upheld in the following states: Arizona:
Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744 (Ariz. 1977); Florida: Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon
Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981); Iowa: Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,
293 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 1980); Nebraska: Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb.
1977). Such changes have also been held unconstitutional: New Hampshire: Carson v.
Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); North Dakota: Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
(N.D. 1978); and Ohio: Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas
1976).
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Statutes, against an equal protection challenge, 50 holding that "the
classification created by section 768.50 bears a reasonable relation-
ship to the legitimate state interest of protecting the public health
by ensuring the availability of adequate medical care for the citi-
zens of this state."51 The court deferred to the legislative finding of
a medical malpractice crisis as evidenced in the preamble to the
Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, of which section 768.50
was a part.52
D. Caps on Noneconomic Damages
It is contended that because the increases in huge jury awards
have contributed to the spiraling costs of liability insurance premi-
ums, and because noneconomic losses make up the largest portion
of jury awards, the most obvious way to reduce damage awards
would be to place a ceiling on the amount of damages for pain and
suffering a plaintiff can receive. Critics point out, however, that the
most severely injured claimants who have the most urgent need for
compensation are the ones who will suffer most from such a mea-
sure. To have an impact on premiums,' the ceiling must be low
enough to affect a substantial number of cases. Yet one commenta-
tor reports that most states have placed the ceilings so high in
medical malpractice cases that "they are rarely reached. '53
Prior to the 1986 Regular Session, Florida had no legislation
capping the amount of damages a plaintiff may receive. Subject to
the court's powers of additur and remittitur, the trier of fact has
the ultimate authority to award damages for economic and
noneconomic losses. The most popular ceiling amount enacted in
other states is $500,000, 5" but caps are sometimes imposed as mul-
tiples of economic damages.5 5
50. Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 368 (Fla. 1981). FLA. STAT.
§ 768.50 (1979) mandated offsetting of any court-awarded damages by the amount of any
additional compensation the plaintiff received.
51. Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp., 403 So. 2d 365, 368 (Fla. 1981).
52. Id. at 367-68. Chief Justice Sundberg dissented, calling for stricter judicial scrutiny
concerning whether a medical malpractice insurance "crisis" actually existed. Id. at 369-71
(Sundberg, C.J., dissenting).
53. Karzon, supra note 38, at 697-98.
54. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 31.
55. Just prior to adjourning in 1986, the Washington Legislature enacted a unique mea-
sure, placing a staggered cap on noneconomic damages depending on the age of the plaintiff.
Ch. 305, 1986 Wash. Legis. Serv. 47 (West).
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The Tort Litigation Review Commission recommended that no
cap be placed on noneconomic damages in tort cases.5 The Com-
mission concluded that there was insufficient data available indi-
cating that the relatively few "jumbo" awards are causing a col-
lapse in liability insurance mechanisms or are boosting costs of
products and services. The Commission was presented only with
information on what other states had done to limit awards in the
single area of medical malpractice. A different conclusion might
have been reached, however, if the Commission had been con-
fronted with data demonstrating the current problems associated
with all commercial liability lines.57
An alternative to capping noneconomic damages in medical mal-
practice cases has been offered by the Florida Medical Associa-
tion.5 8 The proposal would allow a health care provider, after re-
ceiving notice from a claimant of intent to initiate litigation for
medical malpractice, to foreclose such litigation by tendering an
offer of all of the claimant's economic losses plus reasonable attor-
ney's fees. The proposal has been touted as a way to better serve
injured plaintiffs by immediately compensating them for their eco-
nomic losses and reasonable attorney's fees, thus avoiding the inev-
itable delay inherent in our adversarial system. Although the Flor-
ida Medical Association's paper on the concept concluded that this
proposal would be constitutional,59 it is possible that a proposal
placing a monetary ceiling on noneconomic damages would have to
overcome some constitutional hurdles.
E. Punitive Damages
The primary reasons for awarding punitive damages are to pun-
ish the tortfeasor and to deter future tortious conduct by other
potential tortfeasors6 0 Plaintiffs who seek punitive damages may
be regarded as private attorneys general. 1
56. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 31-33.
57. The Commission noted that "there is no claim of a general liability insurance crisis."
Id. at 32.
58. CoM. COMM. REVIEW, supra note 7, pt. 2, at 24, 168.
59. The FMA bases its opinion on the partial dissent in Florida Patient's Compensation
Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (Overton, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
60. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981).
61. J. Grass, Model Punitive Damages Statute and Commentary 181, reprinted in COM.
COMM. REVIEW, supra note 7, pt. 2, at app. H.
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1. Role of Judge and Jury
In Florida, when a request for punitive damages is made at the
close of evidence during trial, the judge determines whether there
is a legal basis for such damages in light of any interpretation of
the evidence favorable to the plaintiff.6 2 A legal basis exists when a
tort has been committed in "an outrageous manner or with fraud,
malice, wantonness or oppression."6 Gross negligence alone will
not support an award of punitive damages-there must be wanton
disregard for the rights of others.6 The jury has the discretion to
award punitive damages and to decide upon the amount.6 5
A jury may award punitive damages in different amounts, de-
pending on the evidence and the variable culpability of multiple
defendants.6 6 Damages may be awarded against one or more of the
defendants and not against others, thus, punitive damages are not
joint and several between defendants.6 7
Remittitur of punitive damages by a trial court is unlikely since
the degree of punishment to be inflicted on the defendant is left to
the jury's discretion. 8 Courts may, however, determine that a ver-
dict for punitive damages is excessive when the award "bears no
relation to the amount the defendant is able to pay and results in
economic castigation," or when the tortious conduct "is lacking the
degree of maliciousness and/or outrageous disregard for the plain-
tiff's rights required to sustain the amount of the verdict. 6' Puni-
tive damages need not bear a reasonable relationship to the com-
pensatory damages awarded, thus remittitur cannot be based on
that standard.7 0 The trial court must satisfy the rules that apply to
all remittitur of damages: any excessive award of damages must be
clear from the record-not merely shock the court's con-
science-and an order for new trial must be based on reasons
shown in the record or be based on considerations outside the rec-
62. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435 (Fla. 1978).
63. Id. at 435-36.
64. White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1984); U.S. Concrete Pipe
Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983).
65. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978).
66. 17 FLA. JUR. 2D Damages § 125 (1980).
67. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402, 403-04 (Fla. 1965).
68. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978).
69. Id. (citations omitted).
70. Id.
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ord, such as influences that aroused the passion or prejudice of the
jury.71
One criticism of punitive damage awards is that they are more of
a crap shoot than a deterrent device because juries are not given
sufficient standards or boundaries to guide their decision-making.
Deterrence is facilitated by predictability, which punitive damage
awards are lacking. The only guidance a Florida jury receives from
a judge regarding an award of punitive damages is that it may con-
sider the defendant's financial resources.72 Statutory standards
which describe factors to be considered in determining an appro-
priate amount would enhance the likelihood that juries will reach
more predictable results.s
Generally, financial information about the defendant is discover-
able by the plaintiff. Critics of this policy propose that procedural
safeguards be implemented to protect the defendant from disclos-
ure of inflammatory information to the jury and from needless dis-
covery of sensitive personal financial information. For example, the
Model Punitive Damages Statute recommends that no evidence of
the defendant's wealth or financial condition be admissible during
the first phase of a bifurcated trial, and that no discovery of the
defendant's financial condition be permitted unless the jury has
found the defendant liable for punitive damages.74 In Florida, how-
ever, the state constitution allocates the authority to adopt proce-
dural rules solely to the Florida Supreme Court.7 5 Thus, legislative
enactment of the Model Act's discovery provision could be an un-
71. Id. at 435. For further discussion of remittitur, see infra notes 136-43 and accompa-
nying text.
•72. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Civ.) 6.12.
73. For example, a Minnesota statute provides:
Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors which justly
bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the seriousness of hazard to
the public arising from the defendant's misconduct, the profitability of the mis-
conduct to the defendant, the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of
it, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness,
the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct, the
number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct,
the financial condition of the defendant, and the total effect of other punishment
likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including
compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly sit-
uated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant
may be subject.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1986).
74. J. Grass, supra note 61, at 179.
.75. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
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constitutional infringement of supreme court authority in that dis-
covery is a procedural matter.
2. Vicarious Liability of Employers
An employer is vicariously liable for compensatory damages
caused by the negligent acts of employees committed within the
scope of their employment, regardless of whether the employer is
at fault. However, for an employer to be liable for punitive dam-
ages under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the claimant must
show some fault on the part of the employer. It is not necessary
that the employer's fault be willful and wanton, only that it
foreseeably contributed to the plaintiff's injury.7'
Florida public policy prohibits liability insurance coverage for
punitive damages for all but an employer's vicarious liability. The
rationale for the general rule is that the purpose of punitive dam-
ages is to punish and deter misconduct. To allow insurance for pu-
nitive damages is to thwart that punishment. However, because vi-
carious liability is further removed from the direct misconduct
which gave rise to the punitive damages, the punishment aspect of
such damages is not as critical and thus insurance is acceptable."
In his concurring opinion in U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould,78
Justice Ehrlich stated, "Without liability insurance coverage, a
businessman can ill afford the risk of delegating responsibility to
employees who may eventually commit some willful, wanton or
malicious tort in the scope of his [sic] employment. ' '79 Justice Ehr-
lich further indicated he was aware that this policy combines two
conflicting principles: the punishment aspect of punitive damages
and an employer's ability to insure against them. Justice Ehrlich
added that "[t]his conflict can only be resolved by a holding that
there can be no vicarious liability for punitive damages." 80 Chief
Justice Alderman, in dissent, advocated this position and added
that he hoped the Tort Litigation Review Commission would ex-
76. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d at 545, 549 (Fla. 1981). See also
Leesfield, Corporate Liability for Punitive Damages: Where Are We?, ADVOCATE, June 1985,
at 12 (published by the Florida Bar) (discussing the required degree of fault by an
employer).
77. U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983); see also Leesfield,
supra note 76, at 13.
78. 437 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1983) (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1067.
80. Id. n.1.
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amine the issue and recommend that the legislature eliminate em-
ployer vicarious liability for punitive damages. 1
In its report,8 2 however, the Commission recommended enact-
ment of section 909, Restatement (Second) of Torts.8 3 The Re-
statement provides that employers are vicariously liable for puni-
tive damages only if the employer authorized, ratified, or approved
the act, the employee was in a management capacity, or the em-
ployer was reckless in employing the employee.8 ' "However, if lia-
bility is purely vicarious and not based on the principal's outra-
geous behavior, such vicarious liability may be the object of
insurance coverage."8
3. Insurer Liability
Punitive damages in an action alleging bad faith against an in-
surance company are prohibited in Florida unless the insurer's ac-
tions constitute a general business practice and are willful or in
reckless disregard of the insured or beneficiary.86 The existence of
bad faith is a factual determination to be made by the jury. If an
insurance company fails to settle within the policy limits and con-
ceals a settlement offer from the insured, the company is liable for
the judgment amount beyond the policy limits as well as for puni-
tive damages.8 7
Punitive damage awards against insurers for bad faith actions
are appropriate only if there is active concealment and active mis-
representation. Where there is a complete lack of communication
between the insurance company and the insured but no active con-
cealment or misrepresentation, punitive damages will not lie.8 An
insurance company's duty in handling the defense of claims is to
"use the same degree of care and diligence as a person of ordinary
care and prudence should exercise in the management of his own
business."8 9 The insurer must advise the insured of settlement op-
portunities and the probable outcome of litigation, and must also
warn of the possibility of an excess judgment and indicate how the
81. Id. at 1068 (Alderman, C.J., dissenting).
82. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 20.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979).
84. Id.
85. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 21.
86. FLA. STAT. § 624.155(4) (1985).
87. Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531-32 (Fla. 1974).
88. Butchikas v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1976).
89. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980).
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insured might avoid such judgment.90 The Florida Supreme Court
has held that a judgment creditor may directly sue a tortfeasor's
liability insurer for recovery of the judgment in excess of the policy
limits if bad faith or fraud by the insurer is alleged." The court
made available this direct cause of action in recognition of the
state's public policy of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits.
4. Punishment and Deterrence
Because one of the purposes of punitive damages is punishment,
such damages take on a characteristic of criminal law. Critics ar-
gue, however, that procedural safeguards available to the criminal
defendant are not available to the civil defendant. Critics assert
that if criminal punishment is inadequate it should be modified
and enhanced rather than maintaining a quasi-criminal element
within the civil justice system. At the least, these critics contend, a
plaintiff's evidentary burden should be closer to that of a prosecu-
tor. The Model Punitive Damages Statute would replace the ex-
isting standard of a preponderance of the evidence with the crimi-
nal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. e2
The United States Supreme Court declined to rule on the consti-
tutionality of punitive damages in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie.93 Among the questions presented to the Court was whether
a $3.5 million punitive damages award violated the excessive fine
clause of the eighth amendment.9 4 The defendant argued that pu-
nitive damages act as a "surrogate of the criminal law,"965 and
should therefore be subject to the same procedural safeguards. s9
The plaintiff argued that the eighth amendment does not apply to
civil proceedings, and that such damages are not a criminal penalty
subject to that amendment's restrictions.9 7 The Court recognized
90. Id.
91. Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 264 (Fla. 1971).
92. J. Grass, supra note 61, at 179. A middle ground between these two standards is that
of clear and convincing evidence. Minnesota has chosen the following standard of proof:
"Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and convincing evidence
that the acts of the defendant show a willful indifference to the rights or safety of others."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West Supp. 1986).
93. 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986), vacating and remanding 470 So. 2d 1060 (Ala. 1984).
94. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
95. Supreme Court asked to rule on punitive damages issues, Business Insurance, Dec.
2, 1985, at 59, col 2.
96. Id. col. 3.
97. Id.
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the importance of the punitive damages issues but decided the case
on other grounds."'
If punitive damages are intended to punish, the size of the award
must hurt but not bankrupt a defendant. Thus, the wealthier the
defendant, the larger the award. Critics argue that this is unfair
and that it invites juries to engage in wealth redistribution, partic-
ularly with corporate defendants. 99
Critics also argue that punitive damages unjustly enrich the
plaintiff. 00 The Model Punitive Damages Statute addresses this
criticism by recommending that punitive damages be paid into the
state general revenue fund, except for five percent of the recovery
that would be awarded to the plaintiff. The five-percent award
would encourage the public to pursue meritorious suits as private
attorneys general."0 '
In the case of In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois
on May 25, 1979,102 the constitutionality of a New York statute
that denied punitive damages in wrongful death cases was attacked
on equal protection grounds in that parties in wrongful death ac-
tions were unable to obtain punitive damage awards, unlike other
personal injury claimants. 03 The court, pointing out that the clas-
sification involved no suspect class or fundamental right, used the
rational relationship standard of review and found the statute was
properly related to a legitimate state interest. The court indicated
that denial of punitive damages "represents a legislative determi-
nation that a state's interest in protecting defendants from exces-
sive damages outweighs its interest in punishing or deterring mis-
conduct. 10 4 Further, the court noted that "[tihe decision of under
what circumstances punitive damages should be allowed is for the
state legislatures and not this Court.' 0
Whether the goal of deterrence is actually achieved is difficult to
ascertain. It is practically impossible to perform an empirical study
98. Aetna Life Ins., 106 S. Ct. at 1589.
99. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency In The Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1,
61-63 (1982); FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at app. J-6 (minority position of Commission
regarding punitive damages).
100. Haugen & Tarkow, Punitive Damages In Minnesota: The Common Law and Devel-
opments Under Section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 353,
367 (1985).
101. J. Grass, supra note 61, at 187.
102. 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 608.
104. Id. at 610.
105. Id. n.12.
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to determine whether tortious acts have been deterred by such
awards; no one is likely to admit a propensity to commit torts in
an outrageous manner or involving fraud, malice, wantonness, or
oppression.
F. Alternative Dispute Resolution
In what is sometimes called the "second-stage" ' or "second
wave" 10 7 movement, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are
increasingly being integrated into our judicial system. This is so,
one commentator suggests, primarily because of the success of pri-
vate programs such as neighborhood justice centers. 08
The interest in alternative dispute resolution has been spurred
by the increasing caseloads in federal and state courts. Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger addressed this concern in an August 1985
meeting cosponsored by the American Arbitration Association and
the Minnesota State Bar Association when he cited statistics indi-
cating that in 1984, the federal district courts received 261,000 new
cases, compared with roughly 30,000 new civil cases received each
year at the close of World War II.109 In addition to this "need to
save the courts from capsizing under oceans of lawsuits" 10 the
boom in alternatives to traditional adjudication has also been
prompted by the high costs and delays of litigation. From a legisla-
tor's point of view, alternatives provide means of cutting judicial
workload, thus reducing the need for costly new judgeships.1 ' A
study conducted by the Institute of Civil Justice concluded that
the costs associated with each Florida circuit court judge in 1982
were $323,000.112
106. Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JUST. SYs. J. 134,
137 (1984). The "first stage" refers to the development of local alternative dispute media-
tion mechanisms during the last decade. Id. at 135-36.
107. Alfini, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts: An Introduction, 69 JUDICA-
TURE 252, 252-53 (1986).
108. Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About Court Administered Arbitration,
69 JUDICATURE 270, 270 (1986).
109. Chief Justice Supports Arbitration, ArB. TIMES, Fall 1985, at 1.
110. Rosenberg, Can Court-Related Alternatives Help Improve Our Dispute Resolution
System?, 69 JUDICATURE 254, 254 (1986). The author does not in fact see "the basic problem
as a quantity-control challenge." Id.
111. Hensler, supra note 108, at 270.
112. J. KAKALIK & A. ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 50 (1982). "Associated
costs" include salaries of judge and supporting court personnel, operation of court facilities,
purchased services and supplies, and indirect supporting expenditures. Id. at 48-49.
TORT REFORM
The two most common forms of alternative dispute resolution
are arbitration and mediation.113 Although often confused by law-
yers and business professionals, they are quite different." 4 Media-
tion "involves helping people to decide for themselves, [arbitra-
tion] involves helping people by deciding for them."'1 5 More
specifically, "[a]rbitration, like adjudication, involves a coercive
third party who hears evidence and renders a written opinion that
is rationalized by reference to general principles. . . .Mediation,
on the other hand, involves a third party whose role is to facilitate
the participation of the parties in generating a mutually agreeable
settlement.""' 6
To date, most states that have created a court-annexed dispute
resolution mechanism have done so through an arbitration pro-
gram. By October 1985, eighteen states had authorized mandatory
court-administered arbitration programs.1 Between 1978 and
1984, the number of federal courts with arbitration programs more
than tripled."18 In Florida, no statutory authority exists for courts
to refer cases to mediation or arbitration. However, a court may
submit a case to arbitration when the parties have so agreed, 119 or
on a motion by either party in medical malpractice cases, 20 and in
particular disputes between contractors and the Department of
Transportation.' 2'
Although ndt as widespread as arbitration 122 and hence less
researched, court-annexed mediation has been termed "the sleep-
113. Other forms include the mini-trial, the summary trial, and the multi-door court-
house. See generally Finkelstein, The D.C. Multi-Door Courthouse, 69 JUDICATURE 305
(1986); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes,
69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986) (summary jury trial discussed by its originator).
114. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation-Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263
(1986); Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUST. Sys. J. 420,
421-23 (1982).
115. Cooley, supra note 114, at 264 n.8 (quoting Meyer, Function of the Mediator in
Collective Bargaining, 13 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 159 (1960) as quoted in P. GULLIVER,
DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS, A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 210 (1979)).
116. Pearson, supra note 114, at 421-22 (citations omitted).
117. Hensler, supra note 108, at 271.
118. Id.
119. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (1985). FLA. STAT. ch. 682 (1985), the Florida Arbitration Code,
governs disputes subject to arbitration unless the parties stipulate otherwise. See id. §
682.02.
120. Id. § 768.575.
121. Id. § 337.185.
122. Private mediation services abound, however. There are over a dozen national and
regional organizations that offer mediation services and over 180 local programs. Goldberg,
Green & Sander, ADR Problems and Prospects: Looking to the Future, 69 JUDICATURE 291,
297 (1986).
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ing giant of alternative dispute resolution.112 3 Mediation typically
is used for minor criminal matters, landlord-tenant disputes, and
domestic relations, including divorce, child custody, and visitation
rights. Mediation is usually voluntary, although compulsory media-
tion does exist.124 Mediators are typically nonlawyers with back-
grounds in law, psychology, or counseling. If mediation is success-
ful, the parties sign a written stipulation setting forth the outcome
of the mediation, which is filed with the court. If no agreement can
be reached, the parties may proceed to arbitration or directly to
litigation. 1 2  The American Arbitration Association found that
when offered a choice between binding arbitration and professional
mediation, trial attorneys selected mediation over seventy-five per-
cent of the time. a26 For the most part, court-annexed mediation
and arbitration have withstood constitutional attack. 2 7 Some of
the more common avenues of attack are that mediation and arbi-
tration: deny the right to trial by jury; deny due process of law;
deny equal protection of the law; and unconstitutionally delegate
judicial authority. Florida has a rather unique constitutional provi-
sion that guarantees access to the courts, 28 thus providing another
avenue. The legislatively created Study Commission on Alternative
Dispute Resolution, having conducted an in-depth analysis of the
constitutional issues involved in alternative dispute resolution,
concluded that "a court-annexed arbitration or mediation program
clearly can be designed to meet constitutional requirements,' 12 9
123. Coulson, The Coming Evolution in Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE
276, 277 (1986).
124. Cooley, supra note 114, at 266. See also Clark & Orbeton, Mandatory Mediation of
Divorce: Maine's Experience, 69 JUDICATURE 310 (1986) (discussion of Maine's 1984
mandatory mediation statute).
125. For a profile of the Urban Court Program in Massachusetts, see Davis, Community
Mediation in Massachusetts: Lessons From a Decade of Development, 69 JUDICATURE 307,
308-09 (1986).
126. Coulson, supra note 123, at 277.
127. "Although there have been constitutional challenges to voluntary and binding arbi-
tration, none have been successful." Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent
Experience and Trends, 16 FORUM 682, 685 (1982). Contra Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d
474 (Ill. 1972) (statute requiring mandatory arbitration for accident claims under $3,000
violates constitutional right to jury trial); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355
N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1976) (compulsory arbitration provision of medical
malpractice act violates right to jury trial and due process and equal protection guarantees).
128. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 provides: "The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay."
129. Study Comm'n on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Final Report app. C-15 (Mar.
1985) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
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provided it does not deny the disputant's rights to jury trial or to
court access in general.
The Study Commission concluded that the Florida should im-
plement a program combining mediation, arbitration, and trial "as
a matrix of dispute resolution devices to be offered by the courts to
our citizens."' 30 It further recommended that the judicial branch
offer a public "helping" agency, which might be named a "Citizens'
Problem Assistance Office," which would operate to assist citizens
in determining the alternative dispute resolution mechanism that
would be most appropriate in solving their problems. The Study
Commission recommended mediation of minor criminal and civil
complaints that are now handled by citizen dispute settlement pro-
grams, mandatory mediation of contested civil cases, mediation of
civil disputes where no lawsuit has been filed, and voluntary arbi-
tration of civil cases either unresolved by mediation or voluntarily
submitted by the parties.'3 '
An additional avenue of potential attack on any alternative dis-
pute resolution legislation, if drafted too specifically, is that it in-
fringes on the court's inherent rulemaking authority. In Florida,
the exclusive authority to adopt rules for "practice and procedure
in all courts" is vested in the Florida Supreme Court.' 3 Justice
Adkins has defined practice and procedure as "the course, form,
manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a
party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for their inva-
sion."' 33 This broad definition could encompass arbitration or me-
diation legislation, and in fact, the court already has exercised its
constitutional authority to make rules of procedure in the area of
medical mediation.'3 4 One commentator argues, however, that leg-
islative participation is not foreclosed by the court's exclusive au-
130. Id. at 1. Florida currently has a number of functional dispute resolution programs.
See id. at app. E. The Study Commission stressed in its report that its recommendations
were meant to expand, not eliminate, the programs currently operating in Florida. Id. at 5.
131. The full text of the recommendations and commentary is found in the Study Com-
mission's report, id. at 5-22. The Study Commission recommended: the establishment of
minimum qualifications and training standards for mediators and arbitrators; that commu-
nications made during the proceedings be privileged; the establishment of a juvenile alterna-
tives program in each judicial circuit to carry out the provisions of the Florida Juvenile
Justice Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 39.33-.337 (1985); and the establishment of a continuing commis-
sion on alternative dispute resolution.
132. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
133. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972), order
amended, 272 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1973).
134. Parness, The Legislative Roles in Florida's Judicial Rulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L. Rev.
359, 366 n.72 (1981).
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thority, citing the example of the court's adoption without change
of the Florida Evidence Code after it already had been adopted by
the legislature.'35
G. Remittitur and Additur
Through the powers of remittitur and additur, judges can con-
trol the amounts juries assess for damages once the award has been
made. Additur is used to increase an award when the judge deter-
mines it is inadequate; conversely, remittitur is used to decrease an
award deemed excessive. Absent statutory authority, Florida
judges have no common law power of additur.' 36 On the other
hand, Florida law authorizes trial judges to enter orders of remitti-
tur, as long as the plaintiff is permitted to have a new trial in lieu
of remitting the excessive amount.' 37 An order of remittitur may be
entered only when the record shows a jury's award was clearly ex-
cessive or when the judge finds that the jury was influenced by
considerations outside the record.'38
The legislature has authorized remittitur and additur only in ac-
tions based on medical malpractice' 39 and automobile negli-
gence.' 40 In medical malpractice actions the court, upon proper
motion, must review the amount of an award to determine if such
amount is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts and circum-
stances presented to the trier of fact.1 41 If the party adversely af-
fected does not agree, the court must order a new trial on the issue
of damages only.'42 Section 768.043, Florida Statutes, is essentially
the same with respect to automobile negligence cases.143
135. Id. at 364.
136. St. Pierre v. Public Gas Co., 423 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
137. Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619, 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
138. Arab Termite and Pest Control Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1982);
Laskey v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1979); Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430,
436 (Fla. 1978).
139. FLA. STAT. § 768.49 (1985).
140. Id. § 768.043.
141. Id. § 768.49(1). The court must consider certain criteria when determining whether
remittitur or additur is warranted. These include, among other things, whether the amount
awarded indicates prejudice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier of fact; whether
it appears that the trier of fact ignored the evidence or erroneously evaluated the damages
issue; and whether the award is reasonably related to the damages proved and the injury
suffered. Id. § 768.49(5).
142. Id. § 768.49(4).
143. The Tort Litigation Review Commission recommended that the statute be made
applicable to all tort actions, not just those based on automobile accidents and medical
malpractice. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 69.
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H. Offer of Judgment and Demand for Judgment
In order to prevent frivolous lawsuits, Florida's rules of court al-
low a defending party to serve an offer of judgment on the adverse
party any time earlier than ten days before trial.'4 If the offer is
rejected and the actual judgment is ultimately less favorable, the
plaintiff is liable for costs incurred after the offer was made." 5
The Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 in-
cluded an offer of judgment and reciprocal demand for judgment
provision.'" In a medical malpractice action, the party rejecting an
offer or demand was entitled to recover reasonable costs and attor-
ney's fees incurred from the date of the offer if the judgment ob-
tained by the nonfiling party was twenty-five percent higher or
lower than the offer or demand. Also, if an offer or demand was
rejected, neither was admissible in subsequent litigation, except
when pursuing penalties provided in the act.1, 7
I. Itemized Jury Verdicts
With the exception of the trial judge's powers of remittitur and
additur, the jury has unbridled discretion to determine the amount
of damages to be awarded. The lack of guidelines for juries to use
in awarding damages is cited as one reason for the unpredictability
of jury awards; therefore, to foster consistency, juries are some-
times instructed to categorize damages. Itemized verdicts are re-
quired in Florida in medical malpractice actions." 8 In medical
malpractice, the trier of fact is required to itemize amounts
awarded according to past and future damages.
II. HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION
Significant modification of the civil tort system in Florida is not
unprecedented. Insurance availability crises have existed in other
lines of insurance, and demands for tort reform have accompanied
each. Through a decade of change, Florida persevered in applying
discrete reforms primarily affecting medical malpractice, automo-
bile insurance, and workers' compensation.
One of the greatest problems to face the Florida Legislature in
the past decade was the medical malpractice insurance crisis ad-
144. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442.
145. Id.
146. FLA. STAT. § 768.585 (1985), repealed by ch. 86-160, § 68, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 763.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 768.48, repealed by ch. 86-160, § 69, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 763.
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dressed during the 1975, 1976, and 1985 regular Sessions. In re-
sponse to the departure of many insurers offering medical malprac-
tice liability insurance to Florida physicians, the Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1975 was enacted. 4" This law made
several significant modifications in the civil tort system and was
designed to ensure the continued availability of medical malprac-
tice liability insurance in the state. Reforms included the establish-
ment of medical liability mediation panels to hear medical mal-
practice cases,' 5 0 mandatory offset of collateral sources of recovery,
major revision of the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims, a revision in the Statute of Frauds as applied to certain
health care providers, and creation of the Florida medical consent
law. The Medical Malpractice Reform Act liberalized and extended
authority to self-insure to health care providers and health care
facilities and created a temporary joint underwriting association to
provide medical malpractice insurance for certain health care prov-
iders. It also authorized establishment of a Patients' Compensation
Fund designed to protect health care providers from excessive lia-
bility for medical malpractice claims. 15'
Although far-reaching in its attempt to alleviate the medical
malpractice crisis, the 1975 legislation did not quiet the storm;
consequently the 1976 legislature enacted additional stopgap mea-
sures in 1976. Chapter 76-260, Laws of Florida, 52 synthesized pro-
visions relating to modification of the civil tort system and alterna-
tive compensatory mechanisms for medical malpractice claims.
However, before the effectiveness of this law could be measured, it
was declared unconstitutional as violative of the rights to contract,
149. Ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 13. See generally Note, The Florida Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1975, 4 FLA. ST. UL. REV. 50 (1976).
150. Ch. 75-9, § 5, 1975 Fla. Laws 13, 17 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (1979)). In
Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme Court struck down the
medical mediation provision, ruling that it violated the due process clauses of both the
United States and Florida Constitutions. See generally Ehrhardt, One Thousand Seven
Hundred Days: A History of Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels In Florida, 8 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 165 (1980) (explanation of the mediation panels' operation during their five-year
existence).
151. Ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 13.
152. Ch. 76-260, 1976 Fla. Laws 660. See generally French, Florida Departs From Tra-
dition: The Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 423
(1978).
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due process of law, trial by jury, equal protection of the law, and
for containing more than one subject in a single act.153
In 1977, the legislature revised many of the provisions of the
1976 law to comply with the Florida Constitution. 154 In the area of
tort reform, the Medical Malpractice Reform Act modified the col-
lateral source rule, provided for periodic payment of future dam-
ages, provided for itemization of medical malpractice verdicts,
codified the common law doctrines of remittitur and additur in
medical malpractice cases, and eliminated the application of res
ipsa loquitur except in certain circumstances including the failure
to remove a foreign item such as a sponge, clamp, forceps, or other
paraphernalia used in medical procedures.155
In the 1980's, the legislature continued to debate measures
designed to check the rapid increase in insurance premiums and to
guarantee the continued availability of liability insurance. These
measures were often hybrid approaches involving insurance and
tort reforms as well as creation of study commissions. A public
campaign stemming from a petition to amend the Florida Consti-
tution further fueled the fire for legislative action.15 The proposed
amendment, sponsored by the Florida Medical Association and
primarily opposed by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, at-
tempted to accomplish three things: limit noneconomic compensa-
tion to $100,000, ensure that defendants would not pay a percent-
age of damages greater than their actual negligence, and enable
judges to dismiss nonmeritorious cases. 15 7 Although the attempt to
put the issue to a public vote in the November 6, 1984, general
election failed, the campaign was effective in educating the public
on the rising costs of medical malpractice insurance and litigation,
and on the impact of these factors on health care costs. It also set
the stage for yet another legislative debate.
153. French, supra note 152, at 435 & n.40, citing Florida Medical Malpractice Joint
Underwriting Ass'n v. Shevin, No. 76-2792 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1977), rev'd and re-
manded, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1977).
154. Ch. 77-64, 1977 Fla. Laws 98.
155. Id.
156. Malpractice reform drive focuses on savings, Orlando Sentinel, May 18, 1984, at
C3, col. 3; see also Group trying to get malpractice issue on ballot, Tampa Tribune, July
14, 1984, at 5B, col. 1 (discussion of "Reason '84-Committee for Citizens Rights"
campaign).
157. Amendment 9 argued before Supreme Court, Miami Herald, Oct. 2, 1984, at 16A,
col. 2.
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The enactment of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Re-
form Act of 1985155 represented the next milestone of legislative
activity. Reform was proposed in three areas: prevention, claims
resolution, and insurance. The prevention reform imposed greater
duties on hospitals and required them to monitor the quality of
their medical staff. To supplement this effort, the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services was required to increase its
overview of risk prevention programs. A ninety-day presuit screen-
ing process and a limitation on attorney's fees highlighted the
claims resolution reforms. The statutory requirement of mandatory
malpractice insurance was designed to discourage doctors from
practicing outside their areas of insured expertise while guarantee-
ing access to affordable malpractice insurance. 59
The Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985
may have provided some stability in the area of medical malprac-
tice, but another "crisis" was erupting in the area of general com-
mercial liability insurance.1 60 Currently, the battle lines are drawn
in state legislatures throughout the country. On one side are those
who seek immediate sweeping changes in tort law; on the other are
those fighting to preserve the status quo. Leading the drive for tort
reform are those who view the current legal system as one of the
major causes for the ailing state of the commercial liability insur-
ance market. Examples of the liability insurance "crisis" are re-
ported in Florida newspapers almost daily. Businesses from day-
care centers and nursing homes to trucking companies face huge
increases in liability insurance premiums or are unable to find lia-
bility coverage at any cost.
The existence of an insurance crisis is evidenced by soaring un-
derwriting losses. From 1981 to 1984, losses in property and casu-
alty insurance, of which general liability insurance is one line,
jumped from $6.2 billion to $21.4 billion. In 1984, losses offset in-
vestment income and the industry suffered a net loss of $3.8 bil-
lion. In 1984, property/casualty insurance companies paid out
158. Ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180.
159. For a discussion of the 1985 law, see Hawkes, The Second Reformation: Florida's
Medical Malpractice Law, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 747, 749-84 (1985). The Act also incorpo-
rated modifications to medical malpractice cases in the areas of offer and demand for judg-
ment, attorney's fees, remittitur and additur, periodic payment of future damages, punitive
damages pleadings, itemized verdicts, arbitration, and joint and several liability.
160. For a general discussion of the current crisis, see Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com.,
An Overview of Today's Commercial Liability Insurance Market (Jan. 6, 1986) (unpublished
report) (on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Liability Ins.
Mkt. Overview].
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$1.18 for every dollar in premiums received, and in the general lia-
bility area, the payout was $1.51 for every dollar.1 6'
Not everyone agrees with these figures or that a liability insur-
ance "crisis" exists. Robert Hunter, president of the National In-
surance Consumer Organization, claims the insurance industry's
figures are misleading and that the whole "crisis" has been manu-
factured by the industry in an "attempt to intimidate and coerce
state insurance commissioners into sanctioning exorbitant prices
and wholesale changes in tort laws."' 2 If the industry had not
overestimated future losses, had included capital gains and tax
credits as income, and counted stockholders' dividends as losses, it
would have shown a profit of more than $6 billion. '
However, a problem does exist and identifying its cause is prob-
lematic. The insurance market is undisputedly cyclical, subject to
fluctuating underwriting profits and losses.'"4 If past patterns are
reliable indicators, the last two years should have marked the bot-
tom of the current cycle and should be followed by another up-
swing. Many argue that this cyclical movement plus insurers' mar-
ket behavior have caused the insurance crisis; others argue
vehemently that the unpredictable nature of tort law is the major
cause. Precisely determining "the" cause, if there is one, may be an
impossible task.
However, there is no doubt that the legal system affects the cost
of providing insurance. Nor is there any doubt that tort liability
has expanded in the last two decades, as illustrated by the devel-
opment of strict liability, liability without fault, and "toxic tort"
liability. Further, there has been an explosion in the sheer number
161. Multimillion Dollar Liability Judgments Create Premium Panic, 7 Bus. ACTION
NETWORK: WASH. WATCH (Nov. 1985) cited in CoM. COMM. REVIEW, supra note 7, pt. 2, at 1-2
& n.4.
162. When interest rates fell, losses hit, Miami Herald, Sept. 23, 1985, (Business Mon-
day) at 13, col. 2. Ralph Nader, another critic, claims that the insurance industry "is an
industry uniquely positioned to use organizational extortion. , . . They're holding the con-
sumer and government hostage." Liability Ins. Mkt. Overview, supra note 160, at 6.
163. Insurance hides profits, advocates say, Jacksonville Journal, Jan. 7, 1986, at 7B,
col. 1.
164. Some experts, however, dispute that the current cycle is typical. See the statement
of Mavis A. Walters, Senior Vice President, Insurance Service Office, Inc., delivered to the
Senate Committee on Commerce: "This is not just a routine turn in the underwriting cycle.
It has structural as well as cyclical causes.. . . Whereas economic inflation drove the casu-
alty insurance crisis of the mid-seventies, the current one is driven by terrible events and by
changes in liability law." Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., Statement of Mavis A. Walters 8
(Mar. 4, 1986), quoting Marsh & McLennan, Commentary (Dec. 1985) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
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of lawsuits filed with increasingly large damage awards.'6 6 Never-
theless, the fact that the legal system has a tremendous impact on
the insurance industry does not, in itself, mandate tort law modifi-
cation. Many competing social policies have evolved over the years
to form the doctrines that comprise the law of torts. This is not to
say that an existing rule should not or cannot be changed unless it
will play a direct role in alleviating the insurance crisis. The com-
mercial liability insurance crisis is simply this year's catalyst for
legislative scrutiny of the law of torts.
In January and March of 1986, the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee heard extensive testimony on problems and possible solutions
to the commercial liability insurance dilemma. Representatives
from interested groups testified before Senate and House commit-
tees and subcommittees. 16 Representatives from the legal profes-
sion and consumer groups attempted to portray the insurance in-
dustry as having created a false crisis. To support their position
they pointed to the insurance industry's net income (rather than
merely the underwriting loss figures highlighted by industry repre-
sentatives), the high market value of insurance stock, and poor un-
derwriting practices during high interest rate periods. The industry
countered by quoting underwriting losses and "horror stories" of
excessive jury awards and defendants forced to satisfy entire judg-
ments while only minimally at fault. Various insurance industry
165. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
166. The insurance industry was represented by Patricia Casey, General Counsel to the
American Insurance Association; Robert Menke, Chairman of Banker's Life Insurance Co.,
on behalf of the Florida Domestic Insurance Association; James Shamberger and Mindy
Pollack of the Reinsurance Association of America; Bob Trunzo, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co.; Gene Witherspoon, Executive Vice President of Insurance Exchange of the
Americas; and Michael Joye of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae, on behalf of Lloyd's of
London, Continental United States.
The legal profession was represented by Steve Masterson, Florida Academy of Trial Law-
yers; Patrick Emmanuel, President of the Florida Bar; and James Dixon, Jr., Florida De-
fense Lawyers Association.
Consumers were represented by Bill Birchfield, President of Project Civil Reform, Inc.;
Chip Morrison, Assistant General Counsel to the Florida League of Cities; John E.
Thrasher, General Counsel of the Florida Medical Association; Allan Kaufman of Milliman
and Robertson, Inc., presenting an actuarial analysis of American Medical Association Tort
Reform Proposals; Jon Shebel, President of Associated Industries of Florida; Patrick Dick-
inson, Chairman of the National Coalition for Litigation Cost Containment; and Frank
Jackalone of the Florida Consumer Federation. Testimony was also heard from Bill Gunter,
Florida Commissioner of Insurance; David Strawn, Chairman of the Study Commission on
Alternative Dispute Resolution; Mark Peterson, Senior Research Scientist for the Institute
for Civil Justice, the Rand Corp.; and Gerald Wetherington, Chairman of the Florida Bar's
Tort Litigation Review Commission. Fla. S., Comm. on Com., meeting notice (Jan. 7, Mar. 4,
1986) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
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coalitions called for tort reform, contending that reform would en-
able the industry to better predict liability. " Many bills address-
ing tort or insurance issues were filed in the Senate prior to the
1986 Regular Session, but Senate Bill 465168 was the most compre-
hensive, 16a addressing both issues.
III. ANALYSIS
The following section begins with a discussion of Florida's one-
subject rule and its application to the Tort Reform and Insurance
Act of 1986. Various tort provisions of the Act are also analyzed.
167. Fla. S., Comm. on Com., tape recording of proceedings (Jan. 7, Mar. 4, 1986) (on file
with committee).
168. Fla. SB 465 (1986). See supra note 4.
169. Fla. CS for CS for SB 465 (1986) incorporated the following proposed bills:
1. Fla. SB 349 (1986) limited the application of joint and several liability to economic
damages only. This bill became sec. 40 of CS for SB 465.
2. Fla. SB 592 (1986), entitled the "Florida Comparative Fault Act," provided for joint
and several liability only upon a motion made within one year of the final judgment. How-
ever, the liability of the defendant was limited to an amount not greater than the uncollecti-
ble amount multiplied by the defendant's percentage of fault. This bill was the same as sec.
12 within SB 465. The joint and several provisions from SB 349 replaced SB 592.
3. Fla. SB 698 (1986) provided for periodic payments for future losses exceeding $200,000.
The language within this bill was similar to sec. 16 in SB 465 and sec. 44 in CS for SB 465.
The proposed CS for SB 465 was amended to reduce a $500,000 threshold to $350,000. Fla.
S., Comm. on Com., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 30, 1986) (on file with committee).
4. Fla. SB 699 (1986) was similar to sec. 43 of CS for SB 465 except that CS for SB 465
provided a $500,000 cap on noneconomic losses while SB 699 provided a $250,000 cap.
5. Fla. SB 700 (1986) required leave of court to plead punitive damages only after a clear
and convincing evidentiary standard had been met, and authorized distribution of damages
to a trust fund providing medical care for indigent persons, except for 20% paid to the
recovering party's attorney.
6. Fla. SB 701 (1986) removed joint and several liability when negligence is apportioned
among parties.
7. Fla. SB 702 (1986) had the same punitive damages provisions as SB 700, the same cap
on noneconomic damages provision as SB 699, and the SB 701 provision eliminating joint
and several liability.
8. Fla. SB 956 (1986) created an Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and
Tort Systems.
9. Fla. SB 977 (1986) limited noneconomic damages to $250,000 and provided for periodic
payments if future damages exceeded $200,000.
10. Fla. SB 1120 (1986) reallocated joint and several liability to the defendant only to the
extent of an amount not greater than defendant's percentage of fault multiplied by the
uncollectible amount.
11. Fla. SB 1142 (1986) provided that physicians responding to a "code blue" emergency
within a hospital would not be liable for medical treatment given if the physician acts as a
"reasonably prudent man." This provision was not in SB 465 or CS for SB 465.
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A. One-Subject Rule
By enacting the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, the
Florida Legislature fundamentally changed Florida's tort system.
Particularly indicative of the rationale underlying these dramatic
changes are the "whereas" clauses of the preamble which precede
the enacting clause of the Act. These indicia of legislative intent
reflect the legislature's recognition of the existence, causes, and
consequences of the liability insurance crisis and of its umbilical
link to our civil justice system. While virtually all of the legislative
findings and purposes contained in the preamble are, to varying
degrees, well-documented and undisputed, the last four, which ar-
ticulate a direct link between the insurance crisis and tort reform,
are the most adamantly disputed:
[1] the Legislature finds that the current tort system has signifi-
cantly contributed to the insurance availability and affordability
crisis, and... [2] the Legislature finds that tort law and the liabil-
ity insurance system are interdependent and interrelated, and...
[3] comprehensive insurance regulatory reform and tort reform is
necessary to improve the availability and affordability of commer-
cial liability insurance, and. . .[4] the magnitude of this compel-
ling social problem demands immediate and dramatic legislative
action ...."0
These legislative findings are most debated because the constitu-
tionality of the entire Act rests upon them. The Florida Constitu-
tion requires that "[e]very law shall embrace but oneosubject and
matter properly connected therewith. 17 1 However, the Tort Re-
form and Insurance Act of 1986 initially appears tb address two
subjects. If the interrelationship and interdependence of tort re-
form and insurance, as addressed in the Act, do not comprise a
single subject, the entire Act will fail upon judicial scrutiny.
The controlling case on this issue, relied upon throughout the
evolution of the Act, is State v. Lee. 17 2 In that case, the Florida
Supreme Court considered, among other things, whether the Flor-
ida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977173 violated the consti-
tution's one-subject mandate. The 1977 act was intended to ad-
dress insurance problems similar to those which spawned the Tort
170. Ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 699.
171. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6.
172. 356 So. 2d'276 (Fla. 1978).
173. Ch. 77-468, 1977 Fla. Laws 2057.
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Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, although the crisis in 1977 was
in the automobile insurance market. Although the Florida Su-
preme Court found one section of the act unconstitutional on other
grounds,1 74 it expressly held that the 1977 act did not violate the
one-subject rule. 75 The underlying purpose of the one-subject rule
"is to prevent a single enactment from becoming a 'cloak' for dis-
similar legislation having no necessary or appropriate connection
with the subject matter. 176 The court affirmed previous decisions
in which it had recognized that the legislature must be given wide
latitude in enacting laws and stated that the one-subject rule was
"not designed to deter or impede legislatioh by requiring laws to
be unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation. 1 77
The court in Lee concluded that tort reform and insurance were
indeed one issue, and thus that the 1977 act contained only one
subject. The court stated that the act was a legislative effort to
thoroughly address the automobile insurance crisis, and that the
tort reform measures were primarily related to litigation arising
from negligent automobile operation.17 8
Consequently, the inquiry that must be made to determine
whether the present Tort Reform and Insurance Act complies with
the one-subject rule as interpreted by the Lee court is whether tort
reform and liability insurance are so interrelated and interdepen-
dent that they constitute a single subject in the 1986 Act. The
Florida Legislature answered this question in the affirmative in the
preamble of the Act, and empirical evidence appears to support
this conclusion.
Are tort reform and liability insurance, particularly commercial
property and casualty insurance, interdependent and interrelated?
This question was heatedly debated in numerous Senate and
House committee and subcommittee meetings, with proponents
from both sides of the issue countering with contradictory statis-
tics and data. This predicament, experienced nationwide in state
legislatures and at the federal level, exists primarily because gov-
ernment, corporate entities, and other organizations and individu-
174. Id. § 42, 1977 Fla. Laws at 2087, was held unconstitutional in creating the "Good
Drivers' Incentive Fund" because it improperly authorized the use of police power to take
private property from one group of persons for the sole benefit of another limited group.
Further, section 42 violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida
Constitutions. Lee, 356 So. 2d at 278-79.
175. Lee, 356 So. 2d at 282-83.
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als have lacked either the funds or the initiative to sponsor studies
that would definitively identify the major causes and effects of
tort-related problems. Moreover, the problem is compounded be-
cause much of the data is unquantifiable.
During the debate, legislators were informed of many factors
that have combined to cause the liability insurance crisis. Many of
these factors, however, such as the strong United States dollar,
falling interest rates, catastrophic losses from freight and airline
disasters, earthquakes and flooding, and restricted capacity in the
reinsurance market, were beyond the legislature's power to
address.
Nevertheless, two other factors were well within the power of the
legislature to address: insurance regulation and tort reform. It was
undisputed that increased regulation of the insurance industry is
necessary. Industry representatives admitted this, but argued that
such regulation should be significantly less than that ultimately
contained in the Act. The remaining issue was whether tort reform
was necessary to alleviate the crisis.
Studies were presented to the legislature showing that Ameri-
cans engage in civil litigation to the same degree as do citizens of
other industrialized nations.17 9 A local study indicated that Dade
County has not experienced dramatic increases in the number of
cases litigated. 80 Yet at least one commentator has concluded that
ours is the most litigious society in the world.' Chief Justice Bur-
ger recognized this situation as early as 1982 when he stated: "Our
nation is plagued with an almost irrational focus-virtually a
mania-on litigation as a way to solve all problems.' 81 8 2 This con-
clusion is supported by data showing that in 1984 one of every fif-
teen Americans filed a civil lawsuit, amounting to over thirteen
million suits filed in state and federal courts. s' 3 From 1977 to 1984,
the number of civil suits filed in state courts grew four times faster
than did the United States population.8 4
179. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4 (1983).
180. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at app. I (survey of Dade County courts).
181. R. Malott, America's Liability Explosion: Can We Afford the Cost? 2 (Oct. 10, 1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
182. Reinsurance Ass'n of America, U.S. Reinsurance Market Reaction to the U.S. Civil
Justice System 34 (Mar. 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
183. R. Malott, supra note 181, at 2.
184. Lawsuit crisis is hitting Florida hard, Gainesville Sun, May 17, 1986, at 15A, col. 1.
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Not only has the number of lawsuits dramatically increased, but
so, too, have the number of top-dollar awards. The nationwide
trend of million-dollar verdicts is illustrative: from 1962 to 1970
there were twenty-seven verdicts exceeding one million dollars in
personal injury cases, from 1970 to 1977 there were 224 similar ver-
dicts, and in 1982 alone there were 251.' 8" In million-dollar cases,
Florida ranks third-behind California and New York.'86 Florida
may soon climb to the top of this ignominious group: from 1983 to
1985, personal injury verdicts were twenty-eight percent above the
national norm.'
87
Upon finding that these trends adversely affect the insurance
market, particularly the liability market, the legislature deter-
mined which measures would best preserve individual rights while
halting, if not reversing, these trends. There was a lack of defini-
tive information in this area due to systemic complexities and the
unquantifiable nature of many of the problems. Speculation
abounded as to the extent that tort reform would reduce litigation
and, consequently, insurance costs. Moreover, no studies were
presented showing that tort reform would increase costs or that
there would be no impact whatsoever.
A number of studies showed a range of positive effects resulting
from implementation of specific proposals. In particular, a study
conducted by Milliman & Robertson, Inc.,' 88 consulting actuaries
commissioned by the American Medical Association (AMA), esti-
mated the potential one-time savings that would be attributable to
four tort reform measures. The study concluded that implementa-
tion of a mandatory periodic payment of damages provision appli-
cable to future damages exceeding $100,000 would result in a lia-
bility cost savings of 3% to 6% .,81 It also projected savings of up
to 8% for mandatory offset for collateral sources received in per-
sonal injury cases, and savings of up to 12% from capping
noneconomic damages at $250,000.190
185. Defense Research Inst., Statement and Report: The Defense Trial Lawyers Task
Force on Litigation Cost Containment SR 9 (Sept. 1985) (unpublished report) (on file, Flor-
ida State University Law Review).
186. Lawsuit crisis is hitting Florida hard, supra note 184.
187. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL INJURY VERDICT SURVEY 5-6 (1986) (Florida
edition).
188. Milliman & Robertson, Inc., Actuarial Analysis of American Medical Association
Tort Reform Proposals (Sept. 1985) (unpublished report) (on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
189. Id. at 4 & app. A.
190. Id. at 3 & app. A.
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These three measures are contained in the Tort Reform and In-
surance Act of 1986. The collateral source provision is similar to
that contained in the AMA proposal.191 The periodic payment and
noneconomic damages cap provisions are also similar, except that
the periodic payment provision is not mandatory and applies only
to future economic damages exceeding $250,000,192 and the
noneconomic damage cap is set at $450,000.111 While these dissimi-
larities will likely decrease potential savings from the Act, the re-
ductions may be insignificant.
Because the Milliman study was commissioned by the AMA,
some perceived it as slanted toward the AMA's position. However,
few independent statistical analyses have been done to date on the
effects of tort reform on medical malpractice claims. 194
In a 1982 study, Dr. Patricia Danzon evaluated some of the
changes that occurred following the tort reforms enacted in several
states in 1975 addressing the medical malpractice insurance crisis
at that time. Using claims closed between 1975 and 1978, she
found that caps cut the amount of an award by 19% within two
years, and offsets of compensation from collateral sources lowered
awards by as much as 50%.19 In a subsequent report, Doctors
Danzon and Lee Lillard concluded that in states that capped ver-
dicts or permitted periodic payments of awards for future dam-
ages, the average settlement was reduced by 25%, the portion of
cases dropped rose from 43% to 48%, and the share of cases pro-
ceeding to verdict was reduced from 5.1% to 4.6%. 111
Dr. Danzon's most recent study, the preliminary results of which
were made available to the legislature, is perhaps the most persua-
sive because it updates the earlier findings and more accurately re-
flects the long-term effects of 1975 tort reforms by evaluating claim
data from the decade between 1975 and 1984.117 In response to the
191. Ch. 86-160, § 55, 1986 Fla Laws 695, 751 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76).
192. Id. § 57, 1986 Fla. Laws at 752 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78).
193. Id. § 59, 1986 Fla. Laws at 755 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.80).
194. Two important academic studies are P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, RESOLUTION OF MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1982), and P. DANZON, supra note 43. Another statistical analysis
is provided by Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970's:
An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 629 (1985) cited in Danzon, infra
note 197, at 58 & n.6. The Sloan study was not given great weight because it analyzed mal-
practice insurance premiums paid by physicians from 1974-1977, hence the effect of tort
reforms implemented in 1975 and thereafter are unlikely to have been reflected.
195. P. DANZON, supra note 43, at 30.
196. P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, supra note 194, at 26.
197. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evi-
dence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 57 (1986).
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multitude of interrelated factors contributing to claim severity and
frequency in each state and locale, Dr. Danzon cautions "there is
some uncertainty as to the true levels of statistical significance" of
the various reforms. 9 8 The report concludes that: (1) collateral
source offsets are estimated to reduce claim frequency by 14%, (2)
statutes that cap all or part of the plaintiff's recovery have reduced
average severity by 23%, and (3) laws providing for collateral
source offset appear to reduce awards by 11% to 18%.1199
Doctors Danzon and Lillard have been virtually the only re-
searchers to study the effect of tort reforms implemented in re-
sponse to the 1975 medical malpractice crisis. While the legislature
reviewed numerous reports postulating the projected effects of tort
reform measures being considered for 1986, the Danzon studies
were considered the most definitive because they review what has
actually resulted from past reforms. As a result, the 1986 Act con-
tains those provisions shown by Dr. Danzon to have had a positive
effect on the system, specifically: a cap on noneconomic damages,
periodic payment of damages, and offsets for collateral sources.
Regrettably, there was no definitive data available to show the ex-
pected impact of other tort reform measures based upon past im-
plementation.The Danzon data reveal that tort reform will likely
reduce claim severity and, perhaps, frequency. In order to answer
the question of whether tort reform and insurance are interrelated
and interdependent, one further question must be asked: Will de-
creased claim severity and frequency have a positive impact on the
insurance market? While there are only four statistical analyses of
the effect of 1975 tort reforms on the judicial system, there are no
available studies of the impact of these reforms on medical mal-
practice premiums.
Dr. Danzon notes that reduction of claim frequency and severity
cannot automatically be translated into lower insurance premi-
ums.2 0 She states:
First, the net potential impact on premiums also depends on liti-
gation expenses and changes in the timing of disbursement of loss
reserves, and hence investment income. Second, reforms that re-
duce the uncertainty in estimating malpractice claim
costs-namely, caps on awards, periodic payment of amounts for
future damages, and shorter statutes of repose (running from date
198. Id. at 71.
199. Id. at 76-78.
200. Id. at 79.
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of incident, not date of discovery)-may be expected to reduce
premiums by a modest amount, over and above the reduction in
mean expected losses. One can expect this result because of the
reduction in insurers' risk. Perhaps more importantly, by reduc-
ing uncertainty, such reforms should reduce the volatility in price
and availability of malpractice insurance, which is a major ineffi-
ciency of the present malpractice system.201
It should be noted that many commentators who recognize the
interrelationship of the tort and insurance systems concur with Dr.
Danzon's conclusion that one of the primary intended effects of
tort reform is to enable insurers more accurately to predict future
losses and claims costs. To the extent that insurers are better able
to make these predictions, it is hoped that the volatility of the
market together with insurance premiums will decrease.
Many commentators have simply relied on intuition and deduc-
tive reasoning in concluding that tort reform will lower premiums.
One such body of commentators was the Tort Policy Working
Group established by the Attorney General of the United States,
which stated in 1986 that "[tihe increase in the number of tort
lawsuits and the level of awarded damages . . .(or settlements) in
and of itself has an obvious inflating effect on insurance premi-
ums. ''20 2 In order to alleviate the commercial availability and af-
fordability crisis, the Tort Policy Working Group recommended
modifying joint and several liability, capping noneconomic dam-
ages, providing for periodic payment of damage awards, and pro-
viding for collateral source offsets, all of which are contained in the
bill, although not in identical recommended form.203
In the end, some anticipate that the interrelationship and inter-
dependence of the tort and insurance systems will be definitively
shown by premium reduction due to diminished frequency and se-
verity of claims and damage awards, and stabilization of premiums
due to decreased market volatility.
201. Id.
202. Tort Policy Working Group, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the
Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and
Affordability 49 (Feb. 1986) (footnote omitted) (unpublished report) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
203. Id. at 64-72.
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B. Punitive Damages
One of the most important reforms in the Tort Reform and In-
surance Act of 1986 pertains to punitive damages. Although Flor-
ida public policy prohibits liability coverage for punitive damages,
their imposition through vicarious liability20 4 and the threat of
their imposition due to bad faith on the part of insurers20 5 plays a
role in increasing insurance rates.
As stated earlier,206 the Florida Supreme Court has held that a
judgment creditor may sue a tortfeasor's liability insurer directly
to recover a judgment in excess of policy limits if bad faith or
fraud by the insurer is alleged. The legislature determined that the
court's underlying policy of encouraging settlements remains viable
and important, yet goes too far, at least with respect to punitive
damages. Among other things, the threat of bad faith claims by
insureds influences insurance companies to settle marginal claims
for amounts greater than their insured's actual liability. This ineq-
uitable "settlement hammer" increases insurance costs and premi-
ums. The 1986 Act modifies Florida law relating to punitive dam-
ages in many important ways, all of which are designed to equalize
the settlement leverage of all parties and to limit punitive damages
to amounts that are truly merited.
The Act adopts, almost verbatim, the prior restrictions on plead-
ing punitive damages that were applicable to medical malpractice
cases under section 768.498, Florida Statutes. No claim for puni-
tive damages is permitted unless evidence either in the record or
proffered by the claimant would provide a reasonable basis for re-
covery of punitive damages2 0 7 Although "reasonable basis" is not
defined, it is possible that courts will interpret this standard in a
manner similar to the "legal basis" standard currently applied
when determining whether there is sufficient evidence to permit
the issue to go to the jury. Upon a finding by the court of a reason-
able basis for pleading punitive damages, a claimant is entitled to
amend his or her complaint to include a claim for such damages as
allowed by the rules of civil procedure. Furthermore, these rules
are to be liberally construed in favor of discovery that would, pre-
sumably, lead to evidence admissible on the issue of punitive dam-
ages. The Act prohibits discovery of a defendant's financial worth
204. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
207. Ch. 86-160, § 51, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 748 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.72).
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until pleading punitive damages has been allowed by the court."°8
While financial information about a defendant is generally discov-
erable by the plaintiff, the Act limits this discovery to protect a
defendant from disclosure of inflammatory information and to
limit needless discovery of sensitive personal financial information.
The Act places a cap on punitive damages equivalent to three
times the actual damages in any civil action based on negligence;
strict liability; products liability; professional liability; or breach of
warranty involving willful, wanton, or gross misconduct.209 This
provision is perhaps one of the most ambiguous in the entire Act
because it apparently establishes a new standard for the award of
punitive damages. Under prior law, punitive damages were not
awarded in any case unless there was a finding of willful or wanton
misconduct; the Florida Supreme Court has held that gross negli-
gence alone will not support an award of punitive damages.210 The
inclusion of "gross misconduct" in the Act could be considered ei-
ther excess verbiage or as modifying the standard under which pu-
nitive damages may be awarded.
Under the Act, only forty percent of any punitive damages
awarded is to be paid to the plaintiff, and the remaining sixty per-
cent is paid into the General Revenue Fund, or, in cases involving
personal injury or wrongful death, to the Public Medical Assis-
tance Trust Fund created in section 409.2662, Florida Statutes.21'
If the plaintiff's attorney's fee is a contingency fee, it is calculated
based only on the forty percent received by the plaintiff.2 12
The legislature did not address the issue of whether an employer
should be held vicariously liable for punitive damages arising from
the negligent acts of its employees. Elimination of employer vicari-
ous liability for punitive damages-or at least strengthening the
employer liability requirements along the lines of those contained
in the Model Punitive Damages Statute-would remove a burden
from insurers because vicarious punitive liability is presently insur-
able.213 This elimination would appear to be a desirable measure
when one considers that insuring against punitive damages defeats
their primary purpose-punishment.
208. Id.
209. Id. § 52, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 749 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73).
210. U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983).
211. Ch. 86-160, § 52, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 749 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2)).
212. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.73(4)).
213. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
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C. Cap on Noneconomic Damages
One of the most important tort provisions in the Tort Reform
and Insurance Act of 1986 places a cap on noneconomic damages.
Those opposed to a cap primarily argued that its imposition would
be tantamount to putting a price on a person's life, and thus would
be repugnant to the basic foundation of our social structure. These
critics asserted that the jury is best able to determine the amount
of damages plaintiffs are entitled to receive according to the cir-
cumstances of each case. They further contended that juries and
courts have in the past responsibly assessed noneconomic damages
and that there is no evidence that capping such damages would
reduce liability insurance rates. These arguments were instrumen-
tal in the legislature's decision during preceding years not to im-
pose a cap. However, the enormity of the insurance crisis and the
findings of several persuasive studies compelled the legislature to
change its position.
Many studies were presented by organizations from different
sides of the issue, each supporting the position of the particular
group. However, independent studies concluded that a cap would
result in systemic change. As previously noted, Dr. Danzon's 1986
report indicated that in other states, various statutes that cap all
or part of a plaintiff's recovery have reduced average severity by
23%.21 The Tort Policy Working Group concluded that caps on
noneconomic damages, in particular a cap of $100,000, would both
increase predictability and provide substantial savings in the tort
system. 15 In arriving at this conclusion, the report indicated that
only an estimated 2.7 % of all medical malpractice claims-5.6 % of
all paid medical malpractice claims-recover more than $100,000
in noneconomic damages. In those cases, however, awards average
between $428,000 and an estimated $738,000, with 80% of the total
award comprising the noneconomic damages.2"6 Most of the studies
and testimony submitted to the legislature regarding the potential
economic impact of a cap pertained to medical malpractice because
this is the area where most caps are applicable. Most of these com-
mentators suggested that the lower the cap the greater the savings
to the system and, consequently, that insurance premiums would
be reduced.
214. Danzon, supra note 197, at 76.
215. Tort Policy Working Group, supra note 202, at 68-69.
216. Id. at 67.
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Instead of a $100,000 or $250,000 cap, as some organizations sug-
gested, the legislature opted for a cap of $450,000 applicable to
each person so entitled rather than to each plaintiff or claim2 1
7
For example, if an estate brings a wrongful death claim against a
person and prevails on the merits at trial, each survivor of the de-
cedent could be entitled to a maximum of $450,000. It appears that
the legislature chose this compromise figure in an attempt to bal-
ance economic concerns with principles of fairness and the inter-
ests of public policy to ensure a reasonable recovery of
noneconomic damages in any action. When the Act was passed,
Florida joined approximately twenty other states that have imple-
mented caps of some sort, the most common cap being $500,000.2ss
As a result of the recent decision in Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 9 the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of the
cap will be a matter for the Florida Supreme Court. In Fein, the
United States Supreme Court dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question an appeal from a decision by the California Su-
preme Court upholding a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases.2 20 Justice White dissented, pointing out
that the question of
[w]hether Due Process requires a legislatively enacted compensa-
tion scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common law or state law
remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus ap-
pears to be an issue unresolved by this Court ... and is deserv-
ing of this Court's review.22 1
Justice White's dissent, when considered with the holding of a
Florida case, Kluger v. White, 2 2 indicates that such a scheme
might be invalid in Florida. The court held in Kluger that the leg-
islature may not abolish a statutory right of redress that predated
adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution,
nor may it foreclose a right that has become a part of the state's
common law, "unless the Legislature can show an overpowering
217. Ch. 86-160, § 59, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.80).
218. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 20, at 31.
219. 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
220. Some observers say the Court "found by default that California's law was constitu-
tional." Malpractice Insurance: The Market Gets Tighter, MEDICINE & HEALTH PERSPEC-
TFvES 3 (Feb. 3, 1986) (on file, Florida State University Law Review). A comparable Indiana
law has also been upheld, while courts in Texas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio
have overturned malpractice caps. Fein, 106 S. Ct. at 215 (White, J., dissenting.)
221. Fein, 106 S. Ct. at 216 (White, J., dissenting).
222. 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
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public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alterna-
tive method of meeting such public necessity can be shown."223 Al-
though this test would undoubtedly be exceedingly difficult to
meet, other courts, most notably the California Supreme Court in
its decision in Fein,2  have found that the medical malpractice in-
surance crisis was of such import that it was indeed in the public
interest to limit noneconomic damages, and that due process was
not violated. Indeed, although it did not expressly so hold, the Cal-
ifornia court noted that perhaps "the preservation of a viable med-
ical malpractice insurance industry in this state" would provide
the necessary quid pro quo to support the abolition of unlimited
noneconomic damages.225
D. Remittitur and Additur
Although Florida courts are reluctant to interfere with the ver-
dict of a jury, common law principles of remittitur and additur
have been used in the past by the courts to increase or reduce in-
appropriate verdicts. As discussed earlier, the Florida Legislature
in 1977 enacted an additur and remittitur provision applicable spe-
cifically to medical malpractice actions a.2 2  The 1986 Act repeals
this provision and resurrects it in a form applicable to all civil ac-
tions for damages.27
E. Optional Settlement Conference
In a further effort to stimulate pretrial resolution of controver-
sies, the Act recognizes the existing authority of the court2 1 to re-
quire a pretrial settlement conference. The conference must be
held at least three weeks before the date set for trial, and, unless
excused by the court, the attorneys, parties, and persons with au-
thority to settle the case are required to attend.2 29
223. Id.
224. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 106
S. Ct. 214 (1985).
225. Id. at 681-82 n.18.
226. Ch. 76-260, § 15, 1976 Fla. Laws 660, 695 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.49 (Supp.
1976)). See discussion supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
227. Ch. 86-160, § 53, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 749 (to be codified at FL.4 STAT. § 768.74).
228. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200.
229. Ch. 86-160, § 54, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 750 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.75).
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F. Collateral Source Offset
The Act replaces the medical malpractice collateral source stat-
ute2 30 with a substantially similar provision which, like most other
tort reform measures contained in the Act, applies to all civil ac-
tions for damages whether in contract or tort.213 This change in
application appears to expand significantly the classes of cases re-
quiring mandatory offset of collateral sources beyond those involv-
ing personal injury or death. It does not. The offset will only be
required in personal injury cases, because the definition of "collat-
eral sources" is identical to the one that was contained in section
768.50, Florida Statutes.2 32
While the application of this new collateral source provision will
apply to nonmedical malpractice personal injury cases, its impact
may be relatively minimal. That is because the collateral source
provision is principally designed to prevent a windfall or double
recovery by the claimant by precluding the opportunity to collect
insurance benefits plus a damage award from the tortfeasor. Most
of the health and disability insurance coverages defined as collat-
eral sources contractually grant to the insurer a right of reimburse-
ment from the claimant for all amounts collected by the claimant
from a tortfeasor up to the amount paid by the insurer. The Act
attempts to ensure that this procedure will continue by prohibiting
reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation right ex-
ists3 and expressly granting to the collateral source provider a
right of reimbursement for any amounts recovered from the
tortfeasor by the claimant.2 ' The Act further requires that the
amount so reimbursed be reduced by the pro rata share of costs
incurred by the claimant in securing the funds to be reimbursed.235
Repealed section 768.50(1), Florida Statutes, required the court
to reduce any damage award by the total of all amounts paid to
the claimant from all available collateral sources. The Act expands
this by requiring an offset "by the total of all amounts which have
.230. FLA. STAT. § 768.50 (1985).
231. Ch. 86-160, § 55, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 751 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76).
232. "Collateral sources" are payments to the claimant pursuant to the United States
Social Security Act or any other government disability act; any health, sickness, or disability
insurance, except life insurance; any contract or indemnity agreement providing coverage for
damages resulting from the incident; and any contractual or voluntary wage continuation
plan. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(a)).
233. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1)).
234. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(4)).
235. Id.
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been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise
available to him, from all collateral sources. '23 6 This provision does
not indicate how the courts are to deal with benefits that are cur-
rently available but in dispute and which in the future may or may
not be paid to the claimant, nor with future benefits that may ac-
crue as a result of long-term disability. At the least, this provision
adds an element of uncertainty and indefiniteness that will be dif-
ficult for courts to interpret and implement.
G. Joint and Several Liability
Unfortunately, legislators had virtually no data before them
showing what effect abolition or modification of the joint and sev-
eral doctrine would have on insurance rates in particular, or upon
businesses, injured persons, defendants, the court system, or soci-
ety in general. Proponents of both sides of the issue were able to
persuasively show how, in individual cases, modification or aboli-
tion would theoretically help or hurt various segments of society.
In the end, because there was little empirical data available, the
legislature was forced to accept the common sense argument that if
deep-pocket defendants, primarily corporations, are indeed re-
quired to pay more than their proportionate share of damages, this
will adversely affect the liability insurance market because gener-
ally the deep pocket's insurer ends up footing the bill. This likeli-
hood was the overriding concern of the legislature in modifying the
doctrine of joint and several liability.
The Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 creates a two-tiered
system for application of joint and several liability. The first tier
applies to all negligence cases in which the total amount of dam-
ages does not exceed $25,000. In these cases, joint tortfeasors will
be jointly and severally liable for all damages. Thus, the current
law pertaining to joint and several liability is unchanged with re-
spect to this first tier.23 7 The second tier applies to all cases in
which the total amount of damages exceeds $25,000. In such cases
when a defendant's percentage of fault is determined to equal or
exceed that of the plaintiff, that defendant is jointly and severally
liable with any joint tortfeasors for all economic damages. Defend-
ants who are less at fault than the plaintiff are liable only for their
proportionate share of the economic damages, and all defendants
in this second tier of cases, regardless of their degree of fault, are
236. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1)).
237. Id., § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws at 755 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5)).
1986]
552 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:505
liable only for their proportionate share of noneconomic
damages.2 38
The modified version of joint and several liability applies only to
negligence cases, which are defined as civil actions for damages
based upon theories of negligence, strict liability, products liability,
professional malpractice, breach of warranty, and like theories. 239
In determining if an action is a "negligence" action for purposes of
application of the Act, a court must evaluate the substance of the
action rather than the labels used by the parties. The section does
not apply to any action based on pollution or intentional torts or
to causes of action under chapters 403 (environmental pollution),
498 (land sales), 517 (securities), 542 (combinations restricting
trade or commerce), or 895 (RICO).4
One of the practical problems resulting from the joint and sev-
eral liability section of the Act is that the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act 24 1 authorizes contribution only among
tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the same injury
to person or property. In the second tier of cases, a defendant
whose fault is equal to or greater than the plaintiffs is jointly and
severally liable for all economic damages..However, defendants less
at fault than the plaintiff are only proportionately liable for their
share of the economic damages. As a result, a jointly liable defend-
ant could be forced to pay all of the economic damages, but, be-
cause a joint tortfeasor who was less at fault than the plaintiff is
not jointly and severally liable, the defendant who has paid all of
the damages has no right of contribution against that joint defend-
ant for his proportionate share under the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act. Although this initially appears to be a
problem, equity principles and the Florida Supreme Court's ruling
in Lincenberg v. Issen2 42 appear to provide a right of contribution
in this situation.
H. Itemized Verdict
The Act requires the verdict in any civil action to be itemized
according to punitive, economic, and noneconomic damages, both
past and future, and to indicate the period of years on which the
238. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3)).
239. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81(4)(a)).
240. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81(4)(b)).
241. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1985).
242. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975). See discussion supra notes 14-15 and accompanying
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future losses are based.24 This requirement repeals the medical
malpractice provision for itemized verdicts, section 768.48, Florida
Statutes, and will likely give juries more guidance in arriving at the
total award. This section of the Act is also a housekeeping provi-
sion, creating the mechanism necessary for applying the
noneconomic damages cap as well as the structured settlement
provision for future damages. Because the section treads on the
procedural authority reserved by Florida's Constitution to the
Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction, 2" a constitutional challenge
may be made. However, even if the section is found to be unconsti-
tutional, the courts would in effect be forced to require an itemized
verdict by rule in order to apply the requirements of the cap and
structured settlement provisions.
I. Offer of Judgment and Demand for Judgment
The offer and demand section of the Act is similar to section
768.585, Florida Statutes (the medical malpractice section repealed
by the bill), but it applies to all civil actions. 245 The Act authorizes
recovery of reasonable costs and attorney's fees from the date of a
rejected offer or demand if the final judgment varies by twenty-five
percent or more from the amount offered or demanded. The offer
or demand cannot be made until sixty days after filing suit, must
be accepted or rejected within thirty days, and cannot be accepted
later than ten days prior to trial.246
The provision attempts to facilitate settlement and reduce the
workload of the courts. However, cases which are filed and come to
trial earlier than seventy days from the date of filing (meaning no
earlier than sixty days from filing but no later than ten days before
trial) will not be subject to the offer and demand section. The cur-
rent court rule247 will apparently remain applicable to those cases.
Because this section has procedural ramifications, its constitution-
ality may also be challenged.
243. Ch. 86-160, § 56, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 852 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.77).
The verdict should also indicate the period of years upon which future losses are based. Id.
244. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
245. Ch. 86-160, § 58, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 754 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.79).
246. Id. § 58, 1986 Fla. Laws at 754 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1)).
247. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442; see supra text accompanying notes 144-45.
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J. Structured Settlements
This section of the Act,24 8 like other sections, is similar to the
medical malpractice provision, section 768.51, Florida Statutes, re-
pealed by the bill. The Act provides that if future economic losses
exceed $250,000, the court shall, at the request of either party, re-
quire the amount over $250,000 to be paid by periodic payments
rather than by a lump sum.2" 9 The total amount of periodic pay-
ments must be equivalent to all future damages before reduction
to present value, minus attorney's fees payable from future
damages.2 5
Security is required for authorization of periodic payments. If
the defendant is unable to provide adequate security, damages
must be paid in a lump sum. 251 Attorney's fees, if payable from the
judgment, must be paid from past and future damages in the same
proportion.15 2 The claimant, however, is responsible for paying an
attorney's contingency fee calculated solely on the basis of that
part of the award not subject to periodic payments. The defendant
will pay the remaining unpaid portion of the attorney's fees and
will receive credit for this paid amount against future periodic pay-
ments. 5 s If the claimant dies prior to the end of the period that
payments are to be made, the present value of the remaining
amount is to be paid to the claimant's estate in a lump sum. If the
claimant lives beyond the period that payments are scheduled, the
payments will not be extended.254
K. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Senate Bill 465 did not provide any measures regarding alterna-
tive dispute resolution. Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 465
stated that the legislature intended to expedite less costly litiga-
tion by creating court-annexed forms of alternative dispute resolu-
tion.25 That bill would have required the Florida Supreme Court
to develop a plan for statewide implementation of mandatory me-
diation and mandatory nonbinding arbitration for all contested
civil actions, and voluntary binding arbitration for all civil dis-
248. Ch. 86-160, § 57, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 752 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78).
249. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78(1)).
250. Id. § 57 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78(2)).
251. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78(3)).
252. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78(5)).
253. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78(6)).
254. Id. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.78(2)).
255. Fla. CS for SB 465, sec. 47 (1986).
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putes. Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for Senate
Bill 465 deleted this provision.
Senate Bill 396256 established alternative resolution mechanisms
for certain civil disputes. On June 5, 1986, a motion was made to
amend this bill by replacing its more extensive provisions with the
language from Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 465.157 The
Senate passed the amendment unanimously. On June 6, the House
amended Senate Bill 396 by again replacing the new language with
more extensive provisions. 258 The Senate refused to agree259 and
the bill died in messages during the final hours of the 1986 Regular
Session.260 In light of the significant impact such a system could
have in reducing costs associated with litigation, it is unfortunate
that this reform was not enacted.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the nature of the human condition and the complexity of
our relationships, there always has been and always will be inher-
ent unfairness embodied in our system of civil justice. But as civi-
lized people, we must continue to strive for fairness and equity in
our dealings with one another. The Act is the culmination of prior
attempts to remedy deficiencies in Florida's tort law. By enacting
the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, the Florida Legisla-
ture attempted to balance the competing interests of injured par-
ties and their need for compensation against society's willingness
and ability to pay. 61
256. Fla. SB 396 (1986).
257. Fla. CS for SB 465 (1986); FLA. S. JOUR. 748-49 (Reg. Sess. June 5, 1986) (amend-
ment 1 to SB 396).
258. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 1141, 1116 (Reg. Sess. June 6, 1986) (amendment 1 to SB 396).
259. FLA. S. JOUR. 915, 917 (Reg. Sess. June, 6, 1986).
260. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 84, SB 396.
261. More than 280 insurance companies and three national insurance trade associations
filed suit in the Second Judicial Circuit Court of Florida in July 1986, alleging that the Act
in its entirety and various independent provisions are facially unconstitutional. Two provi-
sions targeted by the complaints are those capping noneconomic damages and modifying
joint and several liability. The Second Circuit temporarily enjoined the Department of In-
surance from enforcing provisions of the Act. American Ins. Ass'n v. State, No. 86-2262 (Fla.
2d Cir. July 15, 1986), appeal filed sub nom. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. State, No. BQ-90
(Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 27, 1986), appeal docketed sub nom. Smith v. State, No. 69,551 (Fla.
Nov. 4, 1986). The Florida Supreme Court extended the injunction until December 1, 1986.
Smith v. State, No. 69,551 (Fla. Nov. 4, 1986). As this Article goes to press, no ruling has
been issued.
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